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SUMMARY
Increasingly, cyber security plays a critical role in the welfare of computer networks
for every organization. Computer networks must be secure to ensure healthy operations
and protection of valuable electronic assets (e.g., credit card numbers, account names, and
passwords). However, to achieve this goal, the data within these computer networks must
be monitored across multiple sources such as vulnerability scanners, Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDSs), firewalls, and host systems. Often times, monitoring volumes of data
across multiple sources can potentially be overwhelming. As a result, vital data is at a
greater risk of being overlooked and the time span for analyzing it could be too lengthy.
One way to address this issue is to employ network security visualization techniques to
evaluate security risks and identify malicious activity to help mitigate compromised nodes
on a network. These visualization techniques convert textual network activity into mean-
ingful two-dimensional (2D) or three-dimensional (3D) visual representations, which allow
a user to explore and understand large amounts of information. If a visualization technique
is well-designed, a user could quickly gain new insights and make more informed deci-
sions about network datasets. Building upon this idea, the purpose of this thesis is to intro-
duce a visualization framework to help reduce task-completion time, enhance situational
awareness, decrease user error, and increase the learnability of complex visualizations for
network security applications. From the developed framework, three techniques are sug-
gested as contributions using visualization and interaction: (1) a Stereoscopic visualization
technique aims to increase user awareness of vulnerabilities and malicious attacks, (2) a
recommender system aims to ensure efficient navigation in complex 3D environments, and
(3) an interaction system aims to assist in usability of visualization environments using
Natural User Interfaces (NUIs). To investigate the aforementioned techniques, the follow-
ing tools were created: 3D Stereoscopic Vulnerability Assessment Tool (3DSVAT) [9],
Parallel 3D Coordinate Visualization (P3D) [6], NAVSEC recommender system [10], and
xi




Network administrators are often given tasks to evaluate security risks and malicious ac-
tivity between local and remote hosts on a computer network. Most malicious activity is
monitored via various network systems (e.g., data-sources) such as vulnerability scanners,
firewalls, and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). These systems produce datasets that
are often represented in the form of textual logs and network traffic packet capture (pcap)
files. However, as data volume continues to grow, textual representations of raw output
from multiple data-sources may potentially become too overwhelming to efficiently eval-
uate malicious security risks in a timely manner. Historically, to overcome this challenge,
researchers have investigated converting textual representations of network datasets into
two-dimensional (2D) visual representations to enhance data analysis with visual aids for
further investigation of larger datasets [12]. 2D visualizations produce representations on
the x and y axes, which are used to identify, detect, and analyze malicious information. Yet
as networks become more complex, depicting considerable amounts of information within
2D visualizations can be perceived as cluttered, limited, or misleading [13].
One way to address this design issue is to explore methods for expanding visualization
techniques by incorporating the z-direction. The addition of the z-direction provides depth
for three-dimensional (3D) visualizations that allow more information to be visualized and
result in clearer representations. As a result, 3D visualizations are intuitively perceived to
possess less clutter than its 2D and textual counterparts [13, 14, 15]. Furthermore, clearer
3D visualizations assist network security administrators in identifying a substantial amount
of malicious information and gaining a more accurate global view of the data’s structure.
The work presented in this thesis extends the current research in 3D visualizations by pro-
ducing a framework to leverage advances in 3D visualization techniques and stereoscopic
(i.e., use of 3D glasses) 3D technologies. From this framework, various 3D visualization
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tools and techniques are developed to evaluate the effectiveness of 3D visualizations.
Although 3D visualizations could potentially be useful in network security applica-
tions, the advantages of 3D visualizations alone may not maximize user efficiency and
reduce user error to identify and resolve critical network attacks. Network administrators
must be acclimated with interacting in a network’s 3D environment. Most users are famil-
iar with basic interactions for 2D environments on traditional computer screens, keyboards,
and mice. However, the third dimension adds its own complications and complexities in
which a network administrator may not be aware of how to navigate within a 3D space to
review and analyze vital network information. Thus, tools are needed to guide and rec-
ommend intuitive interactions for seamless navigation in 3D environment for quicker task
completion and identification of malicious attacks. This thesis expounds upon a proto-
type system, the NAVSEC Recommender System [10], that can be implemented to assist
network administrators in detection and analysis of network activity.
Additionally, 2D, 3D and stereoscopic 3D visualization techniques for network secu-
rity applications are often employed on traditional desktop, mouse, and keyboard setup of
WIMP (Windows, Icons, Menus, and a Pointer) interfaces [5]. These WIMP interfaces
use an indirect pointing device (e.g., a mouse) where a user positions and tracks a digi-
tal cursor to target an object that represents network attributes (i.e., a node on a network).
The benefit of WIMP interfaces is that they provide simple, easy-to-learn, and easy-to-
use ”point-and-click” interactions [16]. Additionally, these interfaces are well-supported
by current developers for network security applications. However, a single mouse cur-
sor provides a maximum of two spatial degrees of freedom (e.g., cursor movement along
the x and y axes). As a result, tasks that require manipulating more than two degrees of
freedom (e.g., 3D interaction) must be broken up into multiple user actions. Furthermore,
with a single cursor, users must make long traversals between spatially distant elements
within an interface. The limited amount of degrees of freedom and long traversal cause
difficulty scaling mouse interactions for more complex applications [17]. Often, WIMP
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interfaces require a user to perform many interactions while the user is navigating through
a vast visualization environment. As a result, the time span to prioritize and analyze critical
data becomes a lengthy process and vital data is at a greater risk of being overlooked. To
alleviate these problems, researchers are investigating mouseless technologies (e.g., touch-
enabled phones/monitors and Microsoft Kinect) that allow for more than two degrees of
freedom [18].
New mouseless technologies are referred to as Natural User Interfaces (NUIs) [19].
NUIs utilize interactions that are ”natural” to the user and provide several key advantages
from traditional mouse and keyboard input. One advantage is NUIs, such as multi-touch
interfaces, provide interactions that can use up to all 10 fingers on both hands and provide
up to 20 degrees of freedom. This allows users to perform more interactions and allow
interactions to be performed in parallel. Research has shown that multi-touch interaction
is about twice as fast as mouse interaction for tasks such as selecting objects that may
represent nodes on a network [20]. In this thesis, the benefits of NUIs are investigated in
complex 3D visual environments for network security applications. In an effort to lever-
age the advantages of NUI and stereoscopic 3D visualization, a Framework for Rendering
Enhanced 3D Stereoscopic (FRE3DS) visualizations for network security is also designed
and implemented. By employing this framework, three techniques are investigated: stereo-
scopic visualizations technique to increase user awareness of vulnerabilities and malicious
attacks, recommender systems to ensure efficient navigation in complex 3D environments,
and a Natural User Interface (NUI) system to assist in usability of visualization environ-
ments.
1.1 Research Objectives and Solutions
The objective of this thesis is to develop efficient interaction and visualization techniques
for a network administrator to (a) enhance situational awareness using stereoscopic 3D
technologies (b) reduce task completion time using recommendation systems (c) decrease
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user error by increasing the visualization space and (d) increase learnability of complex vi-
sualizations for network security applications by incorporating NUIs. In an effort to achieve
these goals, the FRE3DS framework is developed to address three important aspects of us-
ability in network security: visualization, user navigation, and user interaction. Each aspect
is investigated using four prototypes designed from the FRE3DS framework:
1. 3D Stereoscopic Vulnerability Assessment Tool (3DSVAT) ensures increased user
awareness of vulnerabilities and malicious attacks [9].
2. Parallel 3D Coordinate Visualization (P3D) prevents visualization attacks, specifi-
cally IP confusion and windshield wiper attacks [6].
3. NAVSEC Recommender System promotes rapid learning of complex tasks [10].
4. InterSec : Interaction System for Network Security assists in natural interaction of
visualization environments [11].
In comparison to traditional 3D visualization interactions, these prototypes use state-
of-the-art 3D, multi-touch, and motion sensing input devices (e.g., Microsoft Kinect and
3M multi-touch display) for enhanced interaction usability and quicker response times for
potential users to navigate complex visualization environments within network security.
More details for each specific prototype and the FRE3DS framework are provided in the
following subsections.
1.1.1 Framework for Rendering Enhanced 3D Stereoscopic (FRE3DS)
As discussed later, FRE3DS framework was developed for producing rapid customized 3D
visualizations for network administrators to easily and quickly develop various visualiza-
tions and efficiently investigate data. As previously mentioned, the four prototypes were
developed to prevent occlusion attacks, increase situational awareness, reduce interactions
using gesture sets, and reduce response times by using a recommender system.
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1.1.2 3D Stereoscopic Vulnerability Assessment Tool (3DSVAT)
Stereoscopic 3D uses headgear or glasses to enhance the perception of depth for admin-
istrators to quickly detect vulnerable nodes on a network in a 3D space. Utilizing the
FRE3DS framework, a 3D Stereoscopic Vulnerability Assessment Tool (3DSVAT) was
developed to investigate the usage of both monocular cues such as perspective, size, and
occlusion and binocular cues such as binocular disparity to enhance situational awareness.
Through the introduction of 3DSVAT, users could potentially identify data more quickly
and to accurately display complex information.
1.1.3 Parallel 3D Coordinate Visualization (P3D)
P3D assists in detection and increased awareness of distributed coordinate attacks. More-
over, by adding an extra dimension for a parallel 3D coordinate visualization, P3D can pre-
vent information overload and certain types of occlusion-based attacks. Occlusion-based
attacks occur when an attacker injects spoofed packets in a network so that legitimate data
is partially or completely not rendered to a display. Using the enhanced perception of depth
in a stereoscopic 3D visualizations, P3D includes a stereoscopic awareness region, which
helps identify network scans of interest without further filtering techniques and reduces
potential data loss.
1.1.4 NAVSEC Recommender System
3D visualization tools often require advanced knowledge in networking, visualization, and
information security to operate, navigate, and successfully examine malicious attacks.
Novice users, deficient in the required advanced knowledge, may find navigation within
these visualization tools difficult. Thus, a visualization module was developed within the
FRE3DS framework called NAVSEC. NAVSEC is a recommender system prototype for
navigating in 3D network security visualization applications. NAVSEC recommends vi-
sualizations and interactions to novice users. Given visualization interaction input from
a novice user and expert communities, NAVSEC can be used to reduce confusion for a
5
novice user while navigating in a 3D visualization. NAVSEC illustrates with a use-case
from an emulated stealthy scanning attack disguised as a file transfer with multiple concur-
rent connections. Through the use of NAVSEC, the use-case demonstrates a novice user’s
visualization converges towards a visualization used to identify or detect a suspected attack
by an expert user. As a result, NAVSEC can successfully guide the novice user in differ-
entiating between complex network attacks and benign legitimate traffic with step-by-step
created visualizations and suggested user interactions.
1.1.5 InterSec : Interaction System for Network Security
A visualization module was developed, from the FRE3DS framework, called InterSec. In-
terSec is an interaction system prototype that interacts with 3D network security visualiza-
tion tools. InterSec helps network administrators utilize gesture sets to coordinate multiple
inputs across multiple interaction technologies. Using InterSec, a gesture set was adopted
from GestureWorks [8], which combines multiple interactions into a single interaction to
further reduce response times for accomplishing a task such as finding a set of scanned
ports for a node. Through the implementation of the gesture set, users can combine the
use of multiple network tools to evaluate network data more efficiently than its traditional
WIMP counterparts. The FRE3DS framwork applies this gesture set to NUI interfaces
such as multi-touch and hand gestures using 3M multi-touch monitor and Microsoft Kinect
(Kinect for short), respectively. As mentioned earlier, multi-touch systems supports all ten
fingers as input, providing many more input degrees of freedom than mouse inputs. As a re-
sult, network security users possess more interaction options to potentially manipulate data
more quickly. InterSec takes advantage of this increased set of interactions to intuitively
represent a series of smaller interactions or a commonly-used network security task (e.g.,




The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses origin and history
of network security visualization and interaction tools and techniques. Chapter 3 presents
details of the FRE3DS fremework, its general principals and design. Chapter 4 discusses
the 3D Stereoscopic Vulnerability Assessment Tool (3DSVAT). Chapter 5 expounds upon
Parallel 3D Coordinate Visualization (P3D) systems. Chapter 6 provides insight about the
recommender system of NAVSEC. Next, Chapter 7 discusses the Interaction System for
Network Security (InterSec). Lastly, Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and presents guidance




The background and historical concepts of network security and visualization techniques
are further explored in this chapter. A substantial review of previous research and literature
on network security interactions with 2D, 3D and stereoscopic visualization techniques
are provided in great detail. Specifically, the first section presents a history of visualiza-
tion. Next, the following sections include an overview of 2D, 3D, and stereoscopic 3D
visualization within the field of network security. Lastly, a literature review of interaction
techniques is discussed (e.g., recommender systems and multi-touch interaction) and their
relationship to network security.
2.1 History of Information Visualization for Network Security
Information Visualization (InfoVis) is the study of visual representations and interaction
techniques from abstract data. The first occurrence of InfoVis started in 1786 when William
Playfair, a Scottish engineer, portrayed the line graph and bar chart of economic data [21].
Since the beginning of InfoVis, InfoVis has evolved significantly with the advancement of
computer graphics to incorporate more complex 2D/3D techniques (3D scatterplot, 2D/3D
parallel coordinates, 2D link graphs). These techniques take advantage of a user’s massive
visual bandwidth and their ability to process large amounts of visual data. Subsequently,
these advantages allow users to explore, analyze, and understand useful trends and patterns
within more complex and abstract data.
Since InfoVis techniques (e.g., scatter plots, histograms, and line charts) are fundamen-
tally used in data analysis, the application of information visualization techniques is widely
used in most fields of study that contain applied research and problem solving. Therefore,
InfoVis is considered a critical component for many fields such as scientific research, busi-
ness methods, data mining, financial data analysis, education, market studies, genetics, and
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drug discovery. At its core, InfoVis systems consist of two main components: visual rep-
resentation and user interaction. The visual representation component maps textual data
to graphical content that is rendered on a display. The user interaction component involves
a user’s manipulation of a system through a series of interactions as a user explores and
analyzes datasets. However, depending on the characteristics and attributes of the dataset
and the needs of the user, visualization type and interaction techniques may change as well.
Therefore, various areas of research has created subsets of InfoVis to solve specific prob-
lems as it relates to a particular area of research. In this thesis, a specialized subset of
Infovis will be investigated which is Visualization for Network Security (VizSec), with an
emphasis on 3D visualizations.
VizSec, as the name suggests, is the study of visualization techniques for network se-
curity. VizSec has rapidly matured over the past several years. VizSec was first used in the
visual representation of IDS logs [22]. However, advances in computational power has al-
lowed the spread of many 2D/3D visualization techniques and tools to be used across many
network security application (e.g., situational awareness, malware detection, SCADA sys-
tem security, intrusion detection, stealthy port scanning). Primarily, VizSec explores ma-
licious activities on a network using visual representation. Yet, historically, in a variety
of fields such as statistics, pattern recognition, machine learning, and data mining, there
are other traditional techniques to automatically detect, monitor and analyze network at-
tacks. However, as network security attacks continue to become more complex and new
algorithms are developed to prevent automatic detection by traditional methods, VizSec is
needed as an aid to further identify patterns and anomalies that may go undetected.
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2.2 2D Visualization Techniques
As discussed in Chapter 1, 2D visualizations produce representations on the horizontal (x)
and vertical (y) axes to identify, detect, and analyze malicious information. 2D visualiza-
tions are used to visualize network scans, analyze attack patterns and graph routing behav-
ior [23, 24] from data sources such as server logs, packet capture traces, NetFlow data, IDS
logs [25, 15], firewall logs [26], and BGP traces. Although the type of visualization greatly
depends on the data source, understanding the benefits and drawbacks of 2D visualization
techniques may help researchers develop better user-centered approaches. Furthermore,
although the majority of the research presented in this thesis focuses on 3D visualiza-
tions, comprehending the advantages and limitations of 2D visualizations techniques are
important in developing 3D visualizations techniques. Therefore, a non-exhaustive list of
commonly-used 2D visualization techniques are described.
2.2.1 Glyph-based Visualization
Glyph-based visualization perceptually links a marker (glyph) to an important character-
istic in the information, thereby facilitating the rapid transfer of information to the user.
A glyph uses an arrow that may signify the number of hosts on a network or a square,
which may represent average packet size. The glyphs are commonly used to make deci-
sions about the current or past snapshots of a network. Some glyph-based techniques map
data parameters from a system’s logs [27] or associated system statistics (e.g., system load,
number of users, and consumed disk space). An early glyph-based visualization is Visual
Information Security Utility for Administration Live (VISUAL) [1]. VISUAL is a network
security visualization tool that allows users to view communication patterns between an
internal network and an external host. In addition, the tool assists users in detecting abnor-
mal traffic such as port scans or DoS attacks. As illustrated in Figure 1, VISUAL shows
a representation of each internal host as a small square within a larger grid. The larger
grid depicts a set of home hosts to a yellow square, which represents an external host. VI-
SUAL provides insight for networks with up to 2,500 home hosts and 10,000 external hosts.
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Figure 1: VISUAL [1] displaying 80 hours of network data on a network of 1,020 hosts.
In Figure 1, VISUAL displays 80 hours of network data on a network of 1,020 hosts. Al-
though glyph-based systems are useful in portraying a large number of attributes for a node,
displaying a number of attributes for multiple nodes becomes challenging, especially in a
2D visualization. Thus, by using a FRE3DS’s 3D visualization framework, interaction and
visualization space is expanded more than the 2D glyph-based visualization counterpart.
2.2.2 Parallel Coordinate Visualization
Another 2D visualization technique is parallel coordinate visualization [28]. This tech-
nique consists of n parallel lines (axis), typically vertical and equally spaced. In network
security applications, each vertical axis represents a network attribute. For example, the
first, second, and third axes may respectively represent source IP, source port, and destina-
tion port. Each axis is connected via a line. This line denotes the relationship between two
vertical axes and the color of the line may represent a filter for specific hosts or another
attribute (e.g., green stands for TCP connection). An early work on parallel coordinate
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systems is VisFlowConnect [29]. VisFlowConnect focuses on enhancing an administra-
tor’s situational awareness by providing an easy-to-use, intuitive view of NetFlow [30]
data using link analysis. NetFlow records as links between two machines or domains while
employing a variety of visual cues to assist the user. Other works include Rumint [31] and
Parallel Coordinate Attack Visualization (PCAV) [28], which discuss 2D parallel coordi-
nates for detecting unknown large-scale network attacks including internet worms, DDoS
attacks, passive fingerprinting [32] and network scanning activities. PCAV uses hash algo-
rithms to detect nine graphical signatures using a detection algorithm in addition to visual
human monitoring. Some researchers use techniques such as brushing [33] to give some
insight into the behavior of individual source IP addresses. Brushing selects a specific
coordinate or group of coordinates that focus on specific behaviors. However, brushing
may become tedious when trying to select the behavior of one coordinate out of 1000s
of multiple coordinates. In addition, 2D representations may be susceptible to occlusion-
based visualization attacks. The research presented in this thesis investigates the usage of
depth in stereoscopic 3D visualizations using the FRE3DS framework to help prevent these
attacks.
2.2.3 Scatter Plots
A scatter plot displays a collection of points. Each point contains the value of two attributes
determined by the position along the x axis and y axis. An earlier work of scatter plot
is NVisionIP, which uses a scatterplot of a class-B network to allow analysts to quickly
visualize the current state of their network [24]. Another work, Scanveiwer [34], combines
scatterplots, parallel coordinates, histograms and color maps into a single tool. However
occlusions, due to large volumes of datasets, result in cluttered visualizations and may
cause data to be overlooked. In contrast to these techniques, P3D is introduced from the
FRE3DS framework, which uses an awareness region mechanism to highlight important
data and expand the visualization to help prevent occlusions.
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Figure 2: VisAlert [2]: A visualization paradigm for network intrusion detection.
2.2.4 Radial visualizations
Radial visualizations place visual elements along a circle, ellipse, or spiral on a screen.
This layout allows for data to be encoded on both the outer and interior parts of a ring.
The benefits of radial visualizations are its aesthetic appeal and compact layout for user
interaction. Within radial visualizations, data is grouped using sections of a ring. In IDSs,
these sections may represent categories of IDS alerts (Windows, FTP, HTTP, and Snort [35]
alerts). Other past works include VisAlert [2] (as shown in Figure 2), NetSecRadar [36],
and IDSRadar [37]. These works use radial visualization to show the global relationship
between node topology and alert activity. While radial visualization provides more global
insights of a network, more granular information is needed to investigate detailed network
attributes and potential attacks. Through the FRE3DS framework network administrators
could be able to extend global radial visualizations to further investigate the details of
activity alerts and node topology.
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2.2.5 Treemaps
Treemaps use nested rectangles to portray hierarchical relationship. For example, NetVis
[3] (Figure 3) uses a treemap visualization to combine the network security techniques and
general network management in an integrated visualization. Within NetVis, a treemap ex-
presses a global view of a network situation in an organization. The leaves of a treemap
represent the hosts in the organization’s network. The light-colored nodes show alert ac-
tivity for this host in the network while dark-colored nodes illustrate a host without any
alert. Treemaps are useful in displaying hierarchical relationship such as nodes within a
network. However, treemaps are limited to hierarchical data such as IP address space and
the relationship of high dimensional network attributes is lost. In this thesis, the FRE3DS
framework contributes developing highly dimensional techniques that could be used to
complement treemaps and allow for the highly dimensional attributes.
Although this is not a definitive list of 2D visualization techniques, it provides funda-
mental insights into the benefits and disadvantages of existing 2D visualizations. Although
2D visualizations are widely adopted and familiar to a user, 3D visualizations is emerg-
ing into network security and could be used to aid in preventing clutter and information
overload to a user.
2.3 3D Visualization and Related Work
Recently, the gaming, television, computer-aided design, medical, and video graphics in-
dustries introduced stereoscopic 3D technologies to enhance the perception of depth. Stereo-
scopic refers to the use of 3D glasses to enhance the perception of depth by using binocu-
lar disparity. According to MarketsandMarkets, a marketing research firm, the global 3D
technology-products and applications market is expected to reach $227.27 billion by 2016
[38]. Since the 3D market is growing rapidly in the upcoming years, 3D technologies are
becoming more readily available and the latest monitors already are manufactured with 3D
stereoscopic vision capabilities. As a result, security interface designers should consider
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Figure 3: NetVis [3] visualizing hosts in the organization’s network.
designing stereoscopic 3D security tools for complex tasks, large node sets, and important
vulnerability data. It has been shown that stereoscopic 3D is superior to any monoscopic
3D viewing and to any shadow condition for enhancing accurate positioning and resizing
tasks of objects located in 3D space [39]. Thus, network security could benefit from the
creation of a stereoscopic tool that could potentially reduce error and enhance response
rates. As will be explained later, binocular disparity is used in this thesis to enhance vul-
nerability awareness, decrease response times for detecting vulnerable nodes, and prevent
occlusion attacks [40] that confuse and mislead network administrators.
An early work of 3D visualization is Tudumi [4] (as demonstrated in Figure 4). Tudumi
monitors and audits user behavior on a server by visualizing connections using line patterns
and system nodes. These system nodes are displayed with 3D glyphs on multi-layered
concentric disks. Line patterns are used to encode different access methods such as coarse
dashed lines to represent a terminal service and thin dashed lines to represent file transfer.
The work in this thesis builds on Tudumi by including stereoscopic 3D technologies to
perceptually increase the user space and enhance situational awareness.
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Figure 4: Tudumi [4].
Another example is Scapy’s trace 3D function [41], which visualizes a 3D representa-
tion of traceroute data based on linked graphs. Likewise, Ipv6World [41] uses a similar
method to visualize an IPv6 topology. Both Scapy 3D and Ipv6world portray a Python-
based Real-Time 3D visualization of linked Graphs (RT3DG).
PortVis [42] is a visualization tool that aids in detecting large-scale network security
events and port activity. NetBytes Viewer [43] visualizes the historical network flow data
per port of an individual host machine or subnet on a network using a 3D impulse graph
plot. These tools only consider the 4-tuple: source IP, destination IP, source port, and des-
tination port. Thus, these security events show a small amount of detail and only display
the counts of activities rather than the activities themselves. FRE3DS framework could
enhance NetBytes Viewer by incorporating detailed packet header TCP fields such as RST,
FIN, ACK, SYN and fragmentation bits. Various scanning events, such as stealthy intru-
sions at a firewall and IDS can also be detected and identified.
The Spinning Cube of Potential Doom [5] (Figure 5) uses 3D scatter plots to represent
network activity on three axes: the destination IP of the local network on the x-axis, the
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Figure 5: Spinning Cube of Potential Doom [5]
destination port on the y-axis, and the source IP on the z-axis. The color of the glyphs
distinguishes the type of the connection (e.g., UDP or TCP). Their 3D scatter plots are
useful in determining interesting patterns such as clusters or correlations for data using
five parameters: source and destination IPs, source and destination ports, and connection
type. Since the visualization is limited to five parameters, decoys cannot be detected with-
out more parameters such as TCP flags and flow data. As a result, a deeper analysis of
scanning behavior is not possible. The FRE3DS framework addresses these limitations by
visualizing and incorporating more data to help uniquely characterize port scans and fur-
ther understand scanning activity. Additionally, a module of the FRE3DS framework uses
a stereoscopic region to increase awareness and reduce data overload.
Nessus 3D [44] is a node-based visualization that shows the number of vulnerabilities
per node, TCP and UDP blacklisted connections, and patch updates. Although Nessus 3D
depicts vulnerable nodes on a network, the FRE3DS framework differentiates itself from
Nessus 3D by correlating vulnerabilities of multiple nodes across multiple exploits and
categorizing the vulnerabilities for simpler evaluation. Thus, the FRE3DS framework pro-
vides tools and techniques for a better depiction of overall vulnerabilities on a network and
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provides the opportunity to prioritize patch updates. Furthermore, this framework groups
nodes based on vulnerabilities and adds a stereoscopic 3D component for enhanced situa-
tional awareness of vulnerable nodes on a network.
Existing 3D visualizations have also been created to visualize data from IDSs [45] us-
ing techniques such as iconic tree structures, bar charts [46], and 3D scatter plots [5]. In
addition, researchers have used various techniques to represent a larger number of attributes
such as the size of a packet’s payload in bytes, the number of packets, and inter-arrival time.
The primary benefit of these visualizations is that they adequately portray generalizations
of a network’s behavior. However, they do not consider the error due to small subtleties
in various attributes that could potentially be addressed using stereoscopic depth cues. For
example, Visual Autonomous System Topology (VAST) [47] uses link graphs to extract
information from Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) which route messages to assist in un-
derstanding topological properties of the Internet and Autonomous System’s (AS) behav-
ior. VAST uses quad-tree based visualizations to represent Autonomous System Numbers
(ASNs) on a 3D plane. This tool successfully shows leaks from one AS to another AS.
However, when a large number of ASes are present, it is a challenge to determine the depth
(location) of an ASN in the VAST visualization due to a lack of visual cues.
As illustrated by these works of 3D visualization techniques, 3D visualizations within
network security are still burgeoning due to the challenges presented by projecting depth
on a 2D screen. Accurately depicting depth on 2D screens requires 3D interface designers
to use various psychological and cognitive properties, also known as depth cues. In other
words, since displays are physically constrained to 2D projections, these depth cues create
a perception of 3D objects on a 2D plane. Commonly, to represent network security data,
objects become 3D items such as spheres in 3D link graphs or points in 3D scatter plots.
Additionally, depth cues assist users in easily locating, manipulating, and depicting spatial
relationships between given 3D objects.
For 3D visualizations, depth cues are grouped into two categories: monocular and
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binocular. Monocular cues are depth cues that require only one eye to depict depth whereas
binocular depth requires two eyes to depict depth. Some well-known monocular cues in
network security are perspective, size, texture, occlusion, and shadows [48]. If these cues
are used correctly, then obscurities and confusion in network security visualizations can be
reduced. However, after performing a preliminary scan of past research and shown in Table
1, some 3D network security visualizations lack these depth cues and potentially result in
higher error rates and slower decision times. For example, if IP addresses are represented
as spheres, and the size of the spheres represent the amount of data entering the node, the
node’s information cannot be accurately portrayed without a visual cue such as shadowing
to denote where the object is in respect to other objects. In the FRE3DS framework, both
monocular cues are used such as perspective, size, and occlusion and binocular cues such
as binocular disparity to reduce error in 3D network security visualizations. Thus, allowing
users to identify network data more quickly and to accurately display complex information.
Table 1 shows a collection of network security tools and their associated visual cues.
Below is an explanation of monocular cues.
Table 1: Visual cues for network security.
Utilization of Visual Cues in Network Security Tools
Monocular Cues 3D Visualization Tool
Perspective [49, 46, 50, 47, 51, 52]
Size [49, 46, 51]
Texture [49, 38]
Occlusion [53, 49, 46, 50, 38, 47, 45, 51, 52]
Shadows [49, 46, 38]
Motion Parallax None
Binocular Cues 3D Visualization Tool
Binocular Disparity [53]
• Perspective is the notion that parallel lines moving towards infinity converge to a
point on a 2D plane. For example, parallel train track rails appear to meet at the
horizon. Perspective is commonly used in network visualization to add more visual-
ization data.
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• Size refers to the relative position of the two objects of the same known size. If
two objects are known to be the same size at the same distance and one object is
positioned at a closer distance, the second object’s size appears to be larger relative
to the other object.
• Texture represents the level of detail used to represent an object. As objects move
closer, the texture becomes clearer. However, as objects move away, the texture
appears obscure.
• Occlusion is the partially or complete blocking of one object by another object. If
one object completely blocks a second object, then the second object can potentially
be overlooked.
• Shadows occur when the shadow of an object is visible on the object or on different
objects. Shadowing could denote position of an object. For example, if an object
is in front of another object, its shadow will also be in front of the second object’s
shadow.
• Motion parallax refers to the spatial properties within motion. The movement of
the camera or the object can give spatial properties about the 3D location of the
object. When an observer moves, absolute depth information of the distance can
be determined from several stationary objects if the velocity and the direction are
known. Closer objects appear to pass more quickly than objects further away.
In the next section, binocular cues that require two eyes to depict depth for stereoscopic
3D visualizations will be discussed.
2.4 Stereoscopic 3D Visualization Overview and Related Work
As shown in Table 1, many security tools use monocular cues. However, a small number of
tools currently use binocular cues for steroscopic technology. A limited amount of works
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discuss stereoscopic technology in network security. Among a few are Papadopoulos’ work
which discusses CyberSeer [53], a desktop, interactive, immersive, auto-stereoscopic 3D
environment. The environment is integrated with multi-channel immersive sound to en-
hance security awareness. It introduces a 3D auto-stereoscopic environment to analyze
spatial information for intrusion detection [53]. In addition, Ipv6world, which presents a
3D link-node graph of the topology of IPv6 routers, [41] recently added a stereoscopic fea-
ture using red/cyan anaglyphs. CyberSeer is the closest work to the work presented in this
thesis, however it is limited to only visualizing IDSs. Compared to this tool, the FRE3DS
framework will allow better integration with future tools to produce a more holistic 3D
stereoscopic tool set.
In addition, binocular disparity is used in the FRE3DS framework to enhance the per-
ception of depth for stereoscopic 3D visualizations. As a synopsis, three types of binoc-
ular cues are discussed which are binocular disparity, convergence, and accommodation.
Binocular disparity, also called binocular parallax, uses the notion that each eye within
the visual system views two slightly different retinal images. Once the brain processes
these images, it appears to give the illusion of depth. Due to these depth illusion qualities,
binocular disparity can be used for network security in situations where monocular depth
cues do not adequately reveal enough information about the network’s security posture.
Binocular disparity is a primary physiological characteristic that enables the stereoscopic
viewing of objects, within a limited distance, and is widely used for portraying virtual ob-
jects (e.g., images on a computer screen) in real 3D space. Accommodation refers to the
physical adjustment of the ciliary muscles in the eye when moving the focus on particular
objects. When focusing on far objects, the lens in the eye decontracts and increases the
focal length. Convergence is the inward movement of the eyes in an effort to maintain a
single binocular vision of an object. In contrast, using accommodation and convergence to
portray virtual objects in real 3D space is a challenge because both require a physical object
to be present. However, through the use of binocular disparity, specifically in stereoscopic
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Figure 6: 3D Stereoscopic rendering for an image using left and right image.
3D, a physical object does not have to be present for a virtual rendering.
As shown in Figure 4, the stereoscopic rendering environment consists of two cameras:
the right eye camera and the left eye camera. The usage of cameras is commonly used to
create the environment in all 3D stereoscopic applications including 3D movies and 3D
software. Each camera is separated with an average eye separation of 6.2 centimeters to
mimic an average human eye separation. The cameras are positioned parallel to each other
and perpendicular to the projection plane. In stereoscopic 3D, both the projection plane
and the viewport are considered as the physical monitor. Likewise, the width and length
of the viewport represents the length and width of the computer screen in pixels. Before
each visualization is rendered, each camera creates an off-axis frustum with the projection
plane. The viewing angle or fovy of the camera is denoted by the lowercase φ symbol as
shown in Figure 6. The distance between the camera and the projection plane is the focal
length. The left and right cameras produce a left and right image, respectively. As shown
in Figure 4, the left and right images are two slightly unique perspectives of one image and
this image is perceived to be behind the screen. This concept is used in network security
tools when generating a stereoscopic 3D environment.
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2.5 History of Interaction and Stereoscopic 3D Visualizations
Although the primary focus in VizSec is 2D/3D visual representation, user interaction also
plays a significant role. If the usability of VizSec interfaces is increased, the response time
to detect network incidents could potentially be decreased. Furthermore, user error could
also be decreased. Thus, researchers introduced Human and Computer Interaction Security
(HCI-Sec). HCI-Sec is the study of one or more human interactions between one or more
computers as it pertains to VizSec. The aim of HCI-Sec is to improve the usability of secu-
rity features in end-user applications [54]. Using HCI-Sec, researchers analyze and design
Graphical User Interfaces (GUIs) to achieve a more secure and usable system [55]. For ex-
ample, a user may inadvertently misconfigure the security features such as firewalls due to
the design of the interfaces. Rather than focusing on the GUI design, the FRE3DS frame-
work builds upon HCI-Sec by developing an interaction system to help network adminis-
trators reduce the number of interactions with network security 3D visualization tools. By
focusing on the network administrator’s interaction, the network administrator can detect
suspicious network activity more efficiently than traditional methods, independent of the
end user’s configuration or design. This research could help network administrators reduce
response times to mitigate security threats and discover more attacks. Furthermore, most
work in HCI-Sec discusses how the design of 2D interfaces can be improved, but seldom
evaluates the usability of an interface for natural user interactions. This thesis uniquely
discusses how the interactions are used to increase productivity for 3D interfaces by using
recommender systems and NUIs.
A substantial amount of stereoscopic work has been done in the areas of human com-
puter interaction (HCI) [39] and robotics [56, 57]. Yet, currently, no research exists that
uses stereoscopic 3D to provide situational awareness for network security applications. In
the field of HCI, researchers shows that stereoscopic 3D is superior to monoscopic view-
ing, with or without shadow conditions, for enhancing positioning and resizing accuracy
and response time [39]. The use of stereoscopic 3D attributed to a 22% reduction time
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compared to the use of non-stereoscopic visualizations while performing positioning tasks.
With stereoscopic 3D, individuals can perceive large amounts of visual information, es-
pecially if 3D binocular senses are present. Thus, network administrators can manipulate
multidimensional data and transform it into a simplified representation for easy analysis.
This visualization is useful in network security tools that give an overall state of the net-
work and allows the user to manipulate views of data and analyze network data at different
levels of granularity. Other stereoscopy work in HCI domain focuses on examining the
human error and response times for tracing link-node graphs [58]. The work in Ware [58]
shows that 3D depth cues allowed participants to see paths in graphs containing 333 nodes
with better than 92% accuracy. Also, it showed that stereoscopic conditions resulted in the
shortest response times. Additionally, stereoscopic conditions possess substantially lower
percent error rates than non-stereoscopic conditions for large node sets, particularly 333+
nodes for non-skilled users. Skilled observers could see up to a 1000-node graph with
less than a 10% error rate. This is an order of magnitude better than the error rate of 2D
visualizations. Also, tracing node-link graphs is commonly used in network security visu-
alizations such as those that visualize IPv6 topologies [41, 46, 47]. Other 3D stereoscopic
techniques have been used in robotics, construction, and teleoperation applications (for per-
forming dexterous tasks to control machines in real-time from a remote location). Within
teleoperation applications, the remote operators were asked to achieve the requested pick-
and-place task swiftly, without any collisions with obstacles. The results showed that the
operator saved more than 60% of his/her time when completing pick-and-place tasks with
3D stereoscopic visual feedback than its 3D monoscopic counterparts [56, 57]. Thus, 3D
stereoscopic spatial positioning of objects can provide better efficiency using depth in 3D
stereoscopic viewing in visual feedback systems.Within the FRE3DS framework, HCI and
robotic research are applied to network security by adopting 3D stereoscopic viewing tech-
niques to enhance situational awareness, help reduce human error, and increase response
times of network security administrators.
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2.5.1 Recommender Systems
Recently, recommender systems have been used in recommending products and services
such as movies, books and music. Through the popular use of recommender systems, re-
ferrals are generated to a user by correlating identified user interest to similar interest of
others to increase sales. However, these systems have yet to be adopted by network se-
curity applications. Therefore, a module within the FRE3DS framework called NAVSEC
was developed. NAVSEC is a recommender system prototype for network security appli-
cations. NAVSEC combines the interaction behavior of both an expert user ( i.e., skilled
network administrator) and a novice user to assist in discovering network based attacks.
Other systems (e.g., [59]) recommend a single interaction for software applications such
as AutoCAD. On the contrary, NAVSEC recommends a sequence of interactions, which
can be executed by a single advanced action. As a result, my technique is instrumental
in reducing the number of interactions a novice user might use to render a visualization.
NAVSEC can lead to attack discovery with fewer interactions and to more efficient utiliza-
tion of resources (e.g., memory and CPU utilization).
2.5.2 Natural User Interfaces (NUIs)
Traditional GUIs adopt mouse and keyboard interactions, which use artificial elements
like windows, menus, or buttons. On the other hand, NUIs adopt a direct manipulation
style (e.g., touch, voice commands, and gestures). NUIs are useful because NUIs takes
a user’s pre-existing knowledge about manipulating objects in the real world for applica-
tion in computer technologies. As a result, this technology makes NUIs easy-to-use and
easy-to-remember [60]. Some researchers are beginning to deploy NUIs into visualiza-
tions and network security applications [61]. One researcher used multi-touch interaction
for brushing in parallel coordinates [61]. My research adopts a gesture set and integrates
these gestures into an interaction system for network security applications. As a result, the
FRE3DS framework introduces new gestures into the gesture set and includes interactions
from other devices (e.g., Kinect). Other researchers have attempted to develop NUI tools,
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such as using the Kinect device, to perform network attacks. For example, Kinectasploit
[62] uses a 3D virtual environment to test security systems for vulnerabilities by interpret-
ing Kinect’s natural gestures into a series of Metasploit Framework [63] commands. The




DESIGNING A FRAMEWORK FOR RENDERING ENHANCED 3D
VISUALIZATIONS
As mentioned in Chapter 1, VizSec is rapidly maturing and will continue to mature in the
upcoming years due to the emergence of new protocols and growth within the network
security domain. Furthermore, researchers are applying many techniques and tools from
VizSec to the problems of network security, specifically in network traffic analysis. How-
ever, while the design of network tools are founded on the problems of real world use
cases, many tools are rarely tested empirically for usability. In addition, it is difficult for
developers of network security tools to stay abreast, evaluate, and integrate the current ad-
vances in interaction and visualization technology (e.g., stereoscopic 3D and multi-touch
technologies) into network security applications. In this section, I present the FRE3DS
framework to assist developers in producing novel tools and techniques using state-of-the-
art technologies and utilize this framework to study the effects of emerging stereoscopic
and multi-touch technologies. In an effort to verify the aforementioned contributions of
the FRE3DS framework, four prototypes were developed to prevent occlusion attacks (i.e.,
visual information is intentionally overwritten), increase situational awareness, reduce in-
teractions using gesture sets, and reduce response times by using a recommender system.
The four prototypes are 3DSVAT for analyzing vulnerability data on a local area network;
P3D for identifying distributed scanning attacks intended to thwart network administrators;
NAVSEC for providing a system to recommend interactions to novice users; and InterSec
for decreasing interactions using NUIs. In the following section, the design, implementa-
tion and evaluation process for the FRE3DS framework is discussed.
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Figure 7: FRE3DS layer model.
3.1 A Layer Model for the FRE3DS Framework
The FRE3DS framework uses rapid prototyping for 3D network security visualizations
with stereoscopic and multi-touch support. FRE3DS framework is useful for producing
rapid customized 3D visualizations for network administrators to easily and quickly de-
velop various visualizations and efficiently investigate data. The framework uses a layered
approach as shown in Figure 7. The primary concept of the framework is to receive raw
data as input from a network and output a 3D visualization with stereoscopic support. Fur-
thermore, a 3D visualization could be manipulated and evaluated using both traditional
mouse/keyboard technology and non-traditional NUI technology.
The framework is divided into 5 layers: Network Sensor Layer, Attribute Layer, Coor-
dinate Conversion Layer, Vertex Aggregation Layer, 3D Security Stereo Scene Generator,
and an Interaction Layer. Each layer is described below.
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3.1.1 Network Sensor Layer
The first layer of the framework, the Network Sensor Layer (NSL), is used to collect data
from various systems including vulnerability scanners, firewalls, IDSs, keyloggers, and
network traffic analyzers. The raw data is often represented in the form of pcap and log
files. In real time scenarios, the sensors may produce packets and stream the packets to the
NSL via a socket connection. Essentially, most network sensors can plug into the FRE3DS
framework as modules for easy data visualization. Each module parses into a standardized
readable format for the FRE3DS framework.
3.1.2 Attribute Layer
As portrayed in Figure 7, the NSL provides formatted data to the Attribute Layer (AL).
The AL receives, filters, and stores relevant data such as an alert to a firewall log or port
numbers as attributes into a storage location (e.g., MySQL database) for quick and easy
retrieval. An attribute is defined as a characteristic that describes the network behavior.
Although the current prototype stores the attribute in a MySQL database, the FRE3DS
Framework could easily be expanded to include NoSQL technologies, such as MongoDB,
to increase the capacity for concurrent users and data storage and retrieval.In addition, the
storage of each attribute is tagged with a timestamp to ensure past network incidents may
be examined at any time by users.
3.1.3 Coordinate Conversion Layer
After an attribute is produced and archived, it is sent to the Coordinate Conversion Layer
(CCL). The CCL converts the security attributes into 3D environment coordinates. Each
coordinate is determined by the type of visualization and depends on the visual representa-
tion for each attribute. After each attribute is converted into a coordinate, each coordinate is
converted into objects. Objects are actually visual representations for a particular attribute
such as cubes, lines, and planes. Each object contains a vertex array (v0, v1, . . . ,vn) , a
color array (c0, c1, . . . , cn), a texture array (t0, t1, . . . , tn), and a normal array (n0, n1, . . . ,
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nn) as seen in typical 3D graphics rendering. The vertex array consists of the vertices of
objects being displayed. For example, if an IP source address is represented as a cube, then
its vertex array contains 24 vertices created from one (x,y, z) coordinate. The color array
contains the color coordinates of the object. For example, a high threat vulnerability object
can possess color coordinates as red.
The texture coordinates are coordinates for applying a bitmap image to a surface of an
object. Texture coordinates are beneficial when OS logos are textures on objects for OS
fingerprinting. Normal coordinates are vectors that are perpendicular to the surfaces of the
object and used to enhance lighting and shadowing depth cues. Each object is aggregated
into a memory allocation array of vertex arrays and sent to the 3D Security Stereo Scene
Generator (SSG).
3.1.4 3D Security Stereo Scene Generator
The SSG adjusts the OpenGL rendering pipeline using quad-buffer technologies. SSG takes
the object data and passes it through the OpenGL rendering pipeline. The SSG generates
two separate rendering pipelines for each eye. In addition, the SSG coordinates works in
tangent with the interaction layer to regenerate the screen based upon new user input. Once
the two renderings are generated, the right and left visualizations are stored to right and left
back buffers. When the object is rendered to the page, the right and left back buffers swap
with the right and left front buffers. As a result, the security visualization is presented to the
user. The pipeline creates two cameras, a left and right camera, each separated by a distance
of 6.3 centimeters, with an off-axis frustum and positioned at the focal length of the screen.
A camera’s frustum is commonly used in computer graphics to describe a 3- dimensional
region which is visible on a screen. The focal length of the camera refers to if an object is
positioned with a positive z-axis value, the object is positioned within the focal length of
the user’s eye and appears to be in front of the 3D monitor. This visualization concept is
used to display vulnerable nodes in front of the monitor for rapid vulnerability detection
and to help prevent visualization occlusions for distributed network attacks. Moreover, the
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user can manipulate and interact with the 3D interface by zooming, panning, and selecting
rendered objects by taking the newly generated vertex data and passing it back through the
pipelines.
3.1.5 Interaction Layer
The Interaction Layer (IL) is used to manipulate an environment produced by the SSG. The
IL provides traditional and alternative ways for a user to communicate with the visualiza-
tion system, which include mouse/keyboard, multi-touch, and motion-sensing (i.e., Kinect)
technologies. A variety of interaction techniques promote new alternative NUI designs as
well as provide a platform for evaluation and allows a user to choose the appropriate tech-
nique for his/her tool. In the IL, a plugin is loaded to provide input from NUI sensor devices
into FRE3DS framework. The input data is simply coordinates from actions performed by
a user. For example, a LEAP Motion [64] plugin sense hands and fingers at close range
(within 12 inches of a sensor) in 3D space and convert the coordinates from the fingers
into gestures. The IL takes the gestures and maps it to a interaction. Next, the produced
interaction is used to manipulate the visualization. After the interaction is executed, it is
archived. If the NAVSEC module is enabled, the archived interaction could be utilized to
recommend interactions by using the current user’s historic interactions and interactions
from a community of expert users. As discussed in greater detail later, the NAVSEC plugin
within the IL could potentially assist confused novice users.
3.2 System Implementation and Testbed
The FRE3DS framework uses the C++ Object Oriented Model-View-Controller paradigm
for higher modularity and extensibility. A custom OpenGL 3D widget is used within a
QT framework for its cross-platform capability. Thus, the framework compiles and runs
on Windows, GNU/Linux and Mac OS X operating systems. To render the content in
stereoscopic 3D, Nvidia Quadro 2000, Nvidia RF 3D Vision Pro Shutter Glasses, and a
120 Hz Asus 3D monitor for 60Hz screen rendering per eye, as shown in Figure 8, were
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Figure 8: NUI visualization testbed for FRE3DS framework.
used for the 3D steroscopic rendering.
3.3 Evaluation Methods
This research introduces various stereoscopic and non-stereoscopic use cases to evaluate
user error and task completion time. The evaluation investigates whether portraying net-
work activity such as network scans or Denial of Service attacks (DoS) in three dimen-
sions (3D) will reduce human error, decrease task completion time, and increase situational
awareness. The evaluation hypotheses are tested using both use-case scenarios and empir-
ical user testing. The purpose of this study is to provide empirically tested research that
may help reduce error, enhance response rates, and increase awareness of peculiar network
activity. In addition, a goal of this research is to provide methods for the network security
research community and system administrators to interact with large amounts of data using
stereoscopic technologies.
Although stereoscopic and interaction technologies has been evaluated in some HCI
applications [39], this research has not been formally evaluated via user testing and ana-
lyzed for usage in network security applications. Thus, this research evaluates the benefits
of stereoscopic 3D tools in network security applications utilizing user testing methods.
With user testing, various network attack scenarios is analyzed using P3D and is deter-
mined if select framework’s prototypes meet the intended purpose of reducing user error
and response rates.
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3.3.1 User Testing Methods
User testing is an evaluation method in user-centered interaction design to evaluate a Hu-
man Computer Interaction (HCI) technique by testing scenarios of the technique on users.
User testing is commonly used for critiquing foods, evaluating new consumer products,
and testing functionality of websites [65, 66]. My user testing method contained a group
of network visualizations scenarios in which I asked users to analyze and identify mali-
cious activity on the network. Each network visualization scenario ranged in difficulty
from beginner to expert level. Some examples of scenarios were simple port scan, Wind-
shield Wiper attack, Port Source Confusion attack, scans from 100 nodes on the network,
and scans from 300 nodes on the network. A pre-survey was given (given in Appendix)
to determine the expertise of the user. Each user was expected to possess at least a basic
knowledge of networking. During each scenario, l recorded the time taken to successfully
complete each scenario.
3.3.2 Testing Procedure
In this section, a brief overview is provided of the testing procedure for the selected partic-
ipants. The testing procedure was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB). The
testing procedure requires all participants to complete a consent form (given in Appendix).
The consent form verifies that the user fully understands the purpose of the research, any
risks associated with the experiment, and confirm their willingness to participate in the user
testing session. Additionally, all information disseminated to the participants was scripted
to ensure that the explanation of the experiment stays consistent and controlled to limit the
occurrence of skewed results. Once the consent form was completed, a brief pre-survey
was given to ensure the participants have an understanding of the subject matter and to
assess the expertise level of the user. Using the pre-survey, the users were divided into the
following categories:
• Novice user contains only basic knowledge of Internetworking and understands basic
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networking concepts such as IP address, MAC address, or port number. For example,
if a person has taken a basic networking course, but has not pursued networking any
further, then the user is considered a novice user.
• Intermediate user contains basic knowledge of Internetworking and may have com-
pleted projects within networking such as configured servers.
• Advance user fully understands the TCP/IP protocol stack and may have performed
tasks such as built client/server programs and configured routers/switches. Within
network security, an advanced user may have performed more advanced attacks such
as Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) and ARP poisoning. An advanced user may have
knowledge of multiple network security tools and many network attacks.
• Expert user possess extensive knowledge in network security and have performed
research in the field. An expert may have published in the field or contain 5+ years
of experience in a related field.
Within the pre-survey, a user was asked to list any related classes taken in the field of
network communications and network security to further confirm the expertise of the user.
At the conclusion of the pre-survey, the components of the user interface and visualization
techniques were explained to the participants involved in the survey. In addition, various
scenarios, attached in Appendix, were given to ensure that all participants understood the
concept of the visualization techniques during the experiment. If, during the warm-up sce-
narios any participant made consistent inaccurate readings, the participant was considered
as an ”inadequate user” and data for that user was discarded. Each scenario contained
simulated or sample network traffic. For each scenario, users were expected to spend a
maximum of 5 minutes. While each user performed each task, observation, note-taking,
”thinking- out- loud”, and other survey testing methods were used. Observation and note-
taking allowed the observer to notice common mistakes of users, their sequence of logi-
cal choices and created a record of the session’s observations. The ”thinking- out- loud”
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method further enhanced my notes of the user’s experience and led to possible layout re-
construction to decrease confusion during each experiment. Lastly, all participants were
requested to fill out a post experiment survey. This survey served as a means to retrieve
quality feedback such as information and comments from users that were not addressed dur-
ing the experiment. The completion time for each user was 60 to 90 minutes and at least 15
participants with basic networking knowledge for networking courses were recruited from
the Georgia Institute of Technology.
3.3.3 Evaluation Components
The evaluation plan contained both quantitative and qualitative components. each of the
components are described below for the quantitative component:
• Response time refers to the amount of time to perform each task.
• Percentage of task completed is a metric measured by asking a participant to complete
a list of questions after each of the tasks and evaluate the completeness of the answer.
Each answer is given a score and all the scores for a user sums to 100 points.
• User error is measured by evaluating the user’s sequence of interactions and com-
paring that to standard optimal routes. Also, verbal input from the user is used to
measure the tasks.
• Number of interactions counts the sequence of interactions.
• Sequence of interactions in conjunction with the ”thinking- out- loud” is used to
understand the error and misconceptions of completing each task. Also, the sequence
of user interactions is recorded to find which interactions are commonly completed
in error.
For the quantitative component, each participant begins by pressing a start button,
which starts the timer. As the participants perform their actions, they verbally explain
35
them and press the finish button to stop the timer. Programmed hooks are used within each
tool being evaluated to measure the quantitative component. For the qualitative component,
each participant is requested to complete post-survey to evaluate user satisfaction with the
interface used during the session. The user survey is given in the Appendix.
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CHAPTER 4
3DSVAT: 3D STEREOSCOPIC VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
TOOL
Currently, no visualization tool exists that focuses on enhanced network situational aware-
ness for vulnerability correlations between nodes using stereoscopic 3D. Thus, a proto-
type was implemented from the FRE3DS framework called 3D Stereoscopic Vulnerability
Assessment Tool (3DSVAT), which assists in rapid detection of vulnerable nodes using
severity level as a function of depth. Furthermore, 3DSVAT uniquely visualizes the net-
work topology based on a correlation between vulnerabilities and nodes on a local area
network. As a result, 3DSVAT could provide it, among other capabilities, new insights for
the deployment of patch updates.
4.1 3DSVAT System Design
3DSVAT uses the FRE3DS Framework to retrieve attribute input from the Qualys Guard
Vulnerability [67] assessment tool, Common Exposure Vulnerability (CVE) list, and Exploit-
db.com database, as shown in Figure 9. The CVE list is a dictionary of publicly known
security vulnerabilities and exposures. It is published in formats such as XML or HTML
for easy parsing of vulnerability scores and descriptions of the type of node vulnerability.
The AL extracts the information from the NSL, parses the information, and filters the in-
formation into the following relevant attributes: IP, OS, Vulnerability Severity Score, port
number, and the Common Exposure Vulnerability (CVE) identification number. Next, the
CCL converts each attribute into 3D coordinates. The CCL converts severity scores into
coordinates for bar graphs, OSes into textures, IP addresses into sets of cubes based on
severity, and CVE identification numbers into scatter plots. Also, according to the severity
scores, the CCL performs region conversion, which determines the coordinate for a region
explained in later sections. After coordinates have been produced, the vertex aggregation
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Figure 9: 3DSVAT, an implementation of the FRE3DS framework.
layer (VAL) combines these vertices and passes them to the SSG. The SSG creates the left
and right cameras, off-axis frustum, and other components essential for rendering within
an OpenGL environment.
3DSVAT distinctly shows a visualization from an aerial perspective based on x, y, and
z coordinate systems. As shown in Figure 10, the 3D environment renders a stereoscopic
visualization into three regions: the Grouped Vulnerability Region, Vulnerability Type Re-
gion, and Stereoscopic Region. Each region is described below.
4.1.1 Grouped Vulnerability Region
The Group Vulnerability Region portrays grouped nodes by highest vulnerability score sim-
ilar to the Qualys Guard Vulnerability assessment tool [67]. These groups of vulnerabilities
are arranged from severity level 1 to 4. The levels are described below:
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Figure 10: Side view of 3DSVAT visual layout.
• A system is labeled as critical (level 4), denoted by the color red, if its vulnerabilities
allow the compromise of highly sensitive information on a system.
• A system is labeled as serious (level 3), denoted by the color orange, if its vulner-
abilities enable intruders to gain access to specific information, potentially misuse
information from the host, or allow unauthorized use of services such as access to
certain files, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, or mail relay.
• Medium and minimal levels (Level 2/1), denoted by the color yellow, are triggered
if the nodes’ vulnerabilities enable intruders to collect specific information about the
hosts, such as version of software.
The group of correlated vulnerabilities allows the administrator to determine which
nodes are the most vulnerable on a network and most common vulnerabilities between
nodes. Furthermore, this allows administrators to prioritize which vulnerability to patch
first. In addition to grouping, each node contains bar graphs showing the number of vul-
nerabilities of lower level grouped regions.
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4.1.2 Vulnerability Type Region
The Vulnerability Type Region portrays how nodes in a grouped category correlate to spe-
cific vulnerabilities. A list of the common CVE identifiers is positioned horizontally along
the y-axis and the number of nodes is positioned vertically along the z-axis. This region
shows how specific vulnerabilities correlate to nodes on the network. For example, if there
is only one point in the region, then all nodes share a single vulnerability. Furthermore, this
section can be filtered based on types of vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflows or DoS
attacks to introduce further details.
4.1.3 Stereoscopic Region
The Stereoscopic Region (denoted as Stereo Region in Figure 10) displays urgent vulnera-
bilities. The urgent vulnerabilities allow intruders to gain full control of hosts including full
read and write access, remote code execution, and backdoors installations. Since the nodes
are classified as urgent, the highest severity level,these vulnerabilities pose the most serious
threats. As a result, stereoscopic technologies are used to enhance awareness of vulnerable
nodes. These nodes are positioned within the focal length of the user. As a result, with
stereoscopic technologies, the nodes within the Stereoscopic Region are perceived in front
of the physical screen.
4.2 Use-Case Analysis
The following figure shows a visualization of an 18-node LAN network using 3DSVAT.
The vulnerability data is a subset of data taken from a large production network and modi-
fied to portray important capabilities of the 3DSVAT prototype l in a 192.168.3.0/24 subnet.
This visualization shows some interesting correlations between the nodes and their vulner-
abilities by introducing the z-direction. In contrast to 2D visualizations, this tool promotes
scalability by visualizing multiple grouped LAN networks. In Figure 11, each node is
grouped by the highest vulnerability level it possesses and is positioned along the z-axis.
40
Figure 11: 3DSVAT aerial front-view visualization for 18-node LAN.
In this visualization, three nodes demonstrate level 5 vulnerabilities as the highest vulner-
ability level. Level 5 nodes are located in the stereoscopic region and when viewed with
stereoscopic glasses, these three nodes (192.168.3.34, 192.168.3.78, and 192.168.3.84) are
perceived to be in front of the monitor to increase the awareness of the network adminis-
trator.
A side view figure is given to better portray the location of the extremely vulnerable
nodes within the visualization. Accordingly, they are perceived to be closer to the user.
Also, as denoted in Figure 12, each node is categorized based on the highest vulnerabil-
ity level it possesses. For example, 7 nodes possess level 4 vulnerabilities as the highest
vulnerability level. Likewise, 5 nodes possess level 3 as the highest vulnerability level. If
a level 5 node contains more than one vulnerability, the node is positioned closer to the
user. The red node (192.168.3.78) represents a node where root access exploits can be
quickly found by performing a simple Internet search. The red node list was compiled by
comparing CVE data to well-known penetration testing sites.
In addition, the vulnerability type region demonstrates the specific vulnerabilities and
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Figure 12: 3DSVAT aerial side-view visualization.
how they correlate to the nodes in a group. For example, the yellow level 2 nodes 192.168.3.34,
192.168.3.95, and 192.168.3.132 share the same CVE-2002-0510 vulnerability type where
all hosts are transmitting UDP packets with a constant IP Identification field. As a result, an
attacker can fingerprint the operating system version and approximate kernel version of the
three vulnerable systems. Within the level 4 nodes, multiple nodes share multiple vulner-
abilities across multiple levels. Three level 4 nodes have vulnerabilities that can allow an
attacker to use the NetBIOS access to steal a remote user list of authenticated accounts on
the node, including guest accounts. In addition, level 4 nodes 192.168.3.6, 192.168.3.6.7
and 192.168.3.9 are susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks. Moreover, the level 4 nodes
contain a large number of orange bars. This illustrates that they also contain a large number
of level 3 vulnerabilities. However, since there are seven nodes with level 4 vulnerabili-
ties, a network administrator may decide to address the level 4 vulnerabilities first or the
administrator may patch the level 5 nodes first to prevent computers from compromising
the entire network. Nevertheless, this visualization allows the administrator to identify the
best strategy possible, which comply with the security policies of the organization.
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CHAPTER 5
P3D: A PARALLEL 3D COORDINATE VISUALIZATION FOR
ADVANCED NETWORK SCANS
Network administrators are making strong efforts to monitor and protect their network and
protect against malicious attackers. Network attackers often use scanning and enumera-
tion tools [68] to find more topology information and vulnerable services within a network.
Moreover, these attackers attempt to deceive Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and vi-
sualization tools by performing stealthy scans such as scanning from multiple hosts on
a network, spoofing source and destination hosts, and adding noise (e.g., sending repeti-
tive scans from dozens of spoofed IPs) to trigger false positives and generate misleading
information [40]. If these scans are detected before a node is compromised, network ad-
ministrators could use these scans as precautionary indicators for future attacks, reveal less
information about their network, and prevent compromised networks. In this section, I dis-
cuss the benefits of using a stereoscopic 3D parallel visualization technique for network
scanning, in particular, when addressing occlusion-based visualization attacks intended to
confuse network administrators. A prototype tool was developed from the FRE3DS frame-
work called P3D to assist in detection and increased awareness of distributed coordinate
attacks.
5.1 System Design
First, P3D utilizes the FRE3DS framework to capture input from a network traffic sensor.
The network traffic sensor could be a network sniffer such as tcpdump or a custom solution
using the libpcap library. The data from the NSL is passed to the AL in the form of IP
packets and parses the packets into attributes (source IP and port, destination IP and port,
TCP/UDP Protocol). Next, the CCL converts each attribute into 3D coordinates. Based on
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Figure 13: P3D implementation using FRE3DS framework.
the parsed attributes, each coordinate is placed in either the Coordinate Region or Aware-
ness Region. These regions are explained in greater detail later in the chapter. As depicted
in Figure 13, the VAL converts the coordinates and attributes to objects such as a line to
depict a TCP/UDP connection. After the objects have been produced, the VAL combines
vertices and textures and passes them to the SSG. Similar to 3DSVAT, the SSG creates
components essential for rendering in an OpenGL environment (i.e., left/right cameras,
frustums, clipping planes, focal length) to convert textual packet captures into a 3D vi-
sualization with stereoscopic 3D support and interactive techniques such as zooming and
panning.
The P3D system consists of 5 components: Parser, Converter, Detector, Database,
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Figure 14: System design of P3D.
and Visualizer as illustrated in Figure 22. Network packets are sent to the Parser. Once
the Parser recieves the packets it extracts and filters relevant parameters from the packets.
Extraction of relevant data from network packets is important to reduce data size and en-
hance data management for network administrators. The Parser filters and extracts data as
follows: IP, Average Packet Size, Source and Destination Port, IP ID, Fragmentation bit,
Timestamp, and TCP header flags such as SYN, FIN, URG, and PSH, and ACK. Once the
Parser has filtered and extracted all relevant data, it sends this data to the Converter.The
Converter converts the parameters from P3D Flow packets into MySQL format and inserts
them into a MySQL database.
A P3D flow packet is a compacted data format that contains information about a flow.
A P3D flow is defined as a network connection between two nodes or a set of packets with
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the same source IP, destination IP, source port, and destination port. Within a P3D flow
packet, a sequential record of TCP flags is recorded between the source and destination
to help determine the type of scan or connection. Next, the P3D flow data is sent to the
Detector. The Detector examines each flow packet and categorizes the connection as var-
ious scans such as FIN, ACK, SYN, and Ping scans. These scans are commonly used to
bypass firewalls and subvert IDSs. Next, the Detector performs fixed-time detection and
categorizes the scan by examining the flow packets between the two hosts. For example, if
there are at least 15 destination ports scanned in 15 seconds, the Detector categorizes the
connection as an aggressive port scan. 1
P3D uses the C++ Object Oriented Model-View-Controller paradigm for higher mod-
ularity and extensibility in the Visualizer. A custom OpenGL C++ class was developed
within a native Windows 7 operating system. Therefore, P3D can easily extend to in-
clude multi-touch interactions. Similar to 3DSVAT, the FRE3DS framework [9] was used
to produce rapid customized 3D visualizations with stereoscopic support for network ad-
ministrators to easily and quickly develop various visualizations and efficiently investigate
data. As previously discussed, to render the content in stereoscopic 3D, a Nvidia Quadro
2000, Nvidia RF 3D Vision Pro Shutter Glasses, and a 120 Hz Asus 3D monitor for 60Hz
screen rendering per eye was used (shown in Figure 8).
5.2 Visualization Design
Currently, no 3D or 2D visualization tool exists that prevents occlusion-based visualization
attacks. Using 2D planes in P3D, instead of 1D axes, allows administrators to understand
the relationship between source IP and source port. Figure 15 shows a 2D and 3D repre-
sentation of P3D. Figure 15a shows two adjacent planes to portray the relationship between
source port, source IP, destination port, and destination IP.
1This rate is used commonly in IDS configurations such as Snort [35].
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(a) 2D representation of a single destination IP using planes.
(b) P3D scan to a single destination IP.
Figure 15: P3D visualization design.
As shown in Figure 15b, an aerial perspective of P3D is based on the x, y, and z coor-
dinate systems, which consists of two planes and colored links based on connections (e.g.,
green denotes TCP connect() procedure call) between the planes. The aerial perspective
allows users to select features such as pan, rotate, and translate for faster identification of
anomalies on a network than its 2D counterparts. One plane represents a range of source
IPs along the z-axis and a range of destination ports along the y-axis, and the other plane
represents a range of destination IPs and Ports. The ports range from 0 to 65535 and the
IP range depends on the network. The Awareness Region is the stereoscopic portion of the
visualization that appear in front of the screen. The colored line denotes the type of TCP
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Figure 16: Sideview of P3D.
connection in a flow. For example, the color green may mean the source is attempting to
perform a TCP 3-way handshake. Figure 15b clearly shows that one source IP address is
scanning from 5 source ports to 5 destination ports on a single destination IP, as portrayed
by consecutive horizontal lines. Yet another source IP is scanning from one port to 5 desti-
nation ports, as portrayed by a fan pattern. Such a scan goes undetected on most traditional
visual IDS systems. In 2D Parallel coordinate systems, the relationship between source IPs,
source ports, destination IP, and destination ports is lost. The 3D coordinate system design
allows for administrators to uniquely distinguish the scans from different hosts scanning
from the same port and detect more advanced techniques such as occlusion attacks.
The 3D Visualizer creates the left and right cameras, off-axis frustum, and other compo-
nents essential for rendering in a stereoscopic OpenGL environment. The 3D environment
renders a stereoscopic visualization into two regions: the Coordinate Region (CR) and the
Awareness Region (AR).
5.2.1 Coordinate Region
The Coordinate Region (CR) is used to detect stealthy scans, bogus scans, distributed scan
and scans meant to bypass firewalls including SYN, ACK, and FIN scans by coloring the
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connection link. Using stereoscopic 3D, P3D is especially designed to handle more data
than the traditional 2D plots.
5.2.2 Awareness Region
The Awareness Region (AR) is a stereoscopic area that shows a subset of IPs with the
highest priority. P3D uses a detection mechanism to determine interesting scans and priori-
tized IPs by analyzing the TCP/IP attributes in the flow. The detection mechanism visually
groups nodes based on various categories: stealth SYN scanning, ACK scanning, and FIN
scanning. Another option is grouping the nodes into prioritized IPs. Since AR contains IPs
and scanning categorization with the highest priority, stereoscopic technologies are used to
enhance awareness of vulnerable nodes. The nodes’ awareness is enhanced by positioning
the nodes within the focal length of the AR. As a result, with stereoscopic technologies, the
nodes within the AR are perceived in front of the physical screen. These nodes allow the
administrator to determine which nodes are scanning and being scanned within a network
and distinguishes which nodes are potentially compromised.
5.3 Use-Case Analysis
In this section, P3D is evaluated based on use case scenarios for occlusion-based visual-
ization attacks. Next, similarities and differences between Rumint’s 2D parallel coordinate
visualization technique [31] and P3D are discussed. Rumint’s 2D parallel coordinate tech-
nique is used for comparison because this technique, like P3D, has no theoretical limit in
the number of network parameters that can be visualized. Additionally, the 2D parallel
coordinate visualization has, until P3D, led to a quicker understanding and a more infor-
mational graph over that of a 2D/3D scattered plot matrix [28].
5.3.1 Source Port Confusion Attack
One occlusion attack is source port confusion. 2D Parallel coordinate visualizations be-
come confusing when multiple source IPs share the same port [40]. This attack is important
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because it prevents users from understanding how each individual node is behaving on the
network in comparison to other nodes.
Most network scanner tools contain the ability to forge various packets (e.g., RST pack-
ets) from spoofed sources and destination IP addresses as though they are coming from
protected hosts behind the firewall. Although visualization IDSs detect most script kid-
dies scanning activity, more advanced attackers can use a source port confusion attack to
run distributed scans from botnets to subvert IDSs and fool most visualization systems by
sending a mixture of bogus and real TCP connections.
P3D allows users to distinguish the source and destination relationship between 4-tuple
connections (source IP, source port, destination IP, destination port). This distinction al-
lows administrators to quickly determine which host is sending malicious or benign data
and prioritize the IP to prevent occlusion. For example, Figure 17 shows a simulated co-
ordinated botnet attack of 100 nodes, ranging from 1.1.0.0 to 200.254.254.254, attacking
destination IP address 132.3.4.5 on port 30000.
In the 2D case [31], as shown in Figure 17a, the visualization causes confusion and can
be misleading because it is difficult to distinguish whether the scan is coming from one
source host, multiple source hosts, or all source hosts. P3D (Figure 17b) clearly shows that
3 IP addresses, 160.54.85.5 and 197.49.39.98, and 130.32.87.6 are performing scans while
the other IPs are performing a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on port 30000.
As a result, P3D can better pinpoint the behavior of individual targeted source IPs in the
network than its 2D counterpart.
5.3.2 Windshield Wiper Occlusion Attack
Another example of an occlusion attack is Windshield Wiper attack [40], which attempts to
completely obscure a visualization system’s output by manipulating packet header fields in
a coordinated way. Figure 18 is presented to better portray the detection of the extremely
stealthy nodes within the visualization. This attack is created using a packet crafting tool
Hping [69] and each packet is generated using the equivalent source and destination ports
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(a) Rumint [31] 2D Source Port Confusion visualization.
(b) P3D Source Port Confusion visualization.
Figure 17: Use Case 1: Source Port Confusion.
from 40,000-60,000 on a 10.0.0.0 network. Figure 18b shows a visualization of 10.0.0.0
LAN network using P3D. Within the P3D visualization in Figure 18b, the Windshield
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Wiper attack is detected by a resulting diagonal rectangular pattern in the CR.
Unlike in the port source confusion scenario (Figure 18a), the Windshield Wiper attack
can obscure a range of ports rather than one port. To perform such an attack, attackers send
much more data onto the network than a source port confusion scenario on a network. For
this reason, the Windshield Wiper attack is considered more data intensive. As a result,
the Detector applies a filtering algorithm to prioritize scans into the stereoscopic AR.The
algorithm helps prevent data intensive occlusion attacks such as the Windshield Wiper at-
tack while still maintaining other network activity without removing data. This region uses
3D technologies in the Visualizer to enhance the awareness of the scan by perceiving the
scan in front of the computer monitor. As shown in Figure 18b, it clearly shows a scan
in the stereoscopic AR. On the other hand, in Figure 18a, the same filtering algorithm is
applied to detect the prioritized IP and use brushing to portray the scan in blue. However,
in the 2D case [31], occlusion occurs and scan from IP 10.0.3.34 in the 2D visualization is
completely hidden.
5.4 User Study on Efficacy of Stereoscopy in P3D
In this section, the efficacy of P3D under non-stereoscopic conditions and P3D under
stereoscopic conditions are evaluated utilizing user testing methods. Each scenario con-
tains P3D with stereoscopic viewing disabled P3D or P3D with stereoscopic viewing en-
abled P3D-S. With user testing, various network attack scenarios are analyzed using P3D
and determined if P3D-S validates the hypothesis of reducing user error and increasing re-
sponse rates. Each task is evaluated using the timespan to complete each task. Also, both
the number of user interactions and the sequence of interactions to complete each task are
measured. This data collection, in conjunction with ”thinking out loud” technique, provides
valuable insights to find the points where a user may have performed an error.
Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected. Quantitative data was recorded
from participant interactions with the user interface. To verify that all attempts were
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(a) Rumint [31] 2D Windshield Wiper Occlusion attack.
(b) P3D Windshield Wiper Occlusion attack.
Figure 18: Use Case 2: Windshield Wiper Occlusion Attack.
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counted correctly in the post-hoc analysis, for each detection attempt, we plotted inter-
actions. In total, we individually validated 135 attacks from 15 different subjects. Ques-
tionnaire responses were transcribed to a spreadsheet. Qualitative data was gathered from
observations during the study, open questions in the questionnaire, and a post-survey using
5-point Likert scales following the study. This data was transcribed and important themes
identified.
5.4.1 Testing Procedure
For our lab-based evaluation, 15 different subjects were recruited (13 male and 2 female),
aged between 22 and 32 years (mean = 25, sd = 4.7) to take part in our experiments.
To explore 3D stereoscopic conditions, the subjects were asked to detect and identify 9
network scenarios. When each participant arrived at the lab, the tasks were explained to
the participants and each participant was asked to sign a consent form. Then, participants
were instructed on how to use P3D, in particular how to detect common attacks such as port
scans and DoS attacks. A user interface (UI) was developed to automatically guide each
participant through a sequence of screens, each prompting them to enter an explanation of
each attack. Each sequence consisted of the following 9 attacks:
• Port scan is a scan of various services from a single host.
• DoS occurs when one IP attempts to conned to a range of ports on a destination IP
by sending spoofed packets on a network from multiple source ports.
• Port source confusion attack occurs when multiple source IPs share a common
source port [40].
• Port Confusion Attack with DDoS and Scan is defined as a set of source IPs that
sends packets to a a single port on a destination IP. In parallel, 3 source IPs attempts
to scan the network under the rate is used commonly in IDS configurations such as
Snort [35].
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• Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) using SYN flood is used to block services
by sending special crafted packets with the SYN flag enabled by multiple hosts.
• 2 port scans with large noise occurs when a large amount of background noise is
injected into the network while 2 port scans are occurring.
• DDoS with background noise performs a DDoS attack with a large amount of le-
gitimate traffic from remote hosts.
• FTP disguised attack is an attack disguised as a concurrent FTP transfer.
• Legitimate traffic with no attacks represents benign legitimate traffic on a network.
Furthermore, each participant was asked to verbally mention his or her actions. We
recorded response time, recognition error, and interaction error rate during each session.
The response time is defined as the time span for recognizing a visualization goal (i.e.,
successfully detect an attack). The recognition error refers to either a false negative (neg-
ligence) or a false positive (mis-identification) occurrence of network activity. The inter-
action error rate is defined as the ratio between the user’s number of interactions that does
not contribute to identification2 of an attack and total number of interactions that is used to
determine an attack.
5.4.2 Response Time Analysis
Regarding response time, no statistical differences existed among P3D and P3D-S under
non-noisy conditions. A non-noisy condition refers to network dataset that contains traffic
with a low variation of source and destination IPs. However, under conditions where large
amounts of legitimate traffic across a wide variety of IPs (e.g., noisy conditions), P3D-
S allowed for faster user response than P3D. This phenomena occurs in the visualization
because noisy datasets cause visualization occlusions that require the user to perform more
2Identifying the interactions that do not contribute to the identification of an attack is somewhat subjective.
In this work, the interactions perceived to be conflicting with goals stated by the user while performing the
”thinking out loud” method are considered as not contributing to the identification of the attack.
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interactions to understand the visualization. As a result, these visualization occlusions
produce a dense visual representation. Table 5 lists the mean response times in seconds,
respectively, for each of the nine scenarios. For P3D-S, the results show a 11.38 % decrease
in response time for 2 port scans with noise and a 10.88 % decrease in response time for
DoS with noise.
Table 2: Mean user response time (s), broken down by scenario.
Scenario P3D-S (s) P3D (s) Percentage (%)
Port scan 49.01 41.58 15.15
DoS 46.49 43.10 7.29
Port Confusion with DDoS
and Scan
115.18 105.43 8.46
Port source confusion attack 125.67 115.46 8.12
DDoS using SYN Flood 126.95 107.39 15.41
DoS with background noise 182.86 162.96 10.88
2 Port Scans with large noise 180.69 160.136 11.38
FTP disguised attack 191.74 170.99 10.82
Legitimate traffic with no at-
tacks
230.34 196.05 14.89
AVG 138.77 122.57 11.38
5.4.3 Recognition Error Analysis
We analyze recognition error using P3D. The results show no statistical differences existed
either among P3D and P3D-S for recognition error. The thinking out loud technique (i.e.,
verbally explaining actions) is used to assist in understanding error in recognizing an attack.
From this technique, 1.48 % of scenarios of legitimate traffic were misdiagnosed (false
positive) as an attack. Another 1.48 % of attacks were not detected (false negative). This
result notably shows that although no difference exists under stereoscopic conditions, the
P3D tool contains low detection recognition error rate under both stereoscopic and non-
stereoscopic conditions.
5.4.4 Interaction Error Analysis
Similar to the response time, the results for the interaction error show that if the network
contains more noisy traffic, the interaction error rate increases to 22.70 % as shown in
Table 5. As discussed earlier, the interaction error rate is defined as the ratio of a user’s
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number of interactions that does not contribute to identification of an attack and the number
of interactions that is used to to determine an attack. To calculate the interaction error,
each interaction is recorded using programmable hooks and an optimal path is manually
constructed for the recorded interaction set. The analysis shows that 1123 interaction errors
occurred out of 7232 interactions, which approximates to 18.29 percent. The majority of
the error stemmed from the exploration of the visualization and investigation other IPs and
port numbers rather than the IPs and ports of interest.
Table 3: Interaction error rate, broken down by scenario.
Scenario P3D (%) P3D-S (%) Percentage Increase (%)
Port Scan 13.34 12.83 3.82
DoS 12.32 12.40 -0.65
Port Confusion with DDoS and Scan 17.50 16.70 4.57
Port source confusion attack 18.00 16.00 11.11
DDoS using SYN Flood 19.30 16.20 16.06
DoS with background noise 23.20 20.30 12.50
2 Port Scans with large noise 25.50 22.70 10.98
FTP disguised attack 30.50 28.20 7.54
AVG 19.96 18.17 8.24
5.4.5 Subjective Feedback
Participants filled out a post-experiment questionnaire rating their experience with stereo-
scopic 3D on a 5 point Likert scale (1 being most negative and 5 being most positive).
They were asked to comment on effectiveness of stereoscopic 3D visualizations. Further-
more, the qualitative feedback from the study revealed that some participants developed
strategies for detecting attacks. One participant constructed stories and rhymes around the
visualization to make them more memorable (i.e., upright square is scanning a port, not
fair).
Participants from the main study found stereoscopic to be easier to detect attacks, due
to the perceived depth. A couple of participants reported some eye fatigue. This occurrence
is due to the eye’s natural ability to focus on the monitor instead of objects perceived to
be in front of the screen. A proper analysis of memorability requires a longterm study and
was therefore beyond the scope of this work. However, when we asked two participants to
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Figure 19: Distribution of responses to question: ”How do you rate the ease-of-use of the
system?”.
detect attacks two days later and we observed that the participants were still able to detect
the attacks at a rapid rate.
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CHAPTER 6
NAVSEC : A RECOMMENDER SYSTEM FOR 3D NETWORK
SECURITY VISUALIZATIONS
3D network security applications [45, 46] use visualization techniques to extend the vi-
sualization space and show more network activity from more than a single vantage point.
Since displays are physically constrained to 2D devices (e.g., computer monitor), these 3D
environments use visual cues such as shadowing and size to adequately represent depth.
However, most 3D visualization techniques for the network security field encompass a
long range of network data attributes such as IP address, port number, and TCP/IP protocol
that can not be adequately viewed from a single vantage point. Thus, some visualization
designers employ a top-down approach [26] for netowrk administrators to explore 3D vi-
sualization environments. A top-down approach occurs when network administrators start
at an initial visualization that reveals a single overview of the network and manipulate the
visualization environment to discover more specific details to potentially detect network
attacks. Other researchers use a bottom-up approach [70], which starts from an initial node
on a network and expands to show the relationship between other nodes. This approach
is useful where the dataset is too large for a top-down approach. In both top-down and
bottom-up approaches, obtaining different views of the network requires a user to perform
interactions that manipulate and navigate within these visualization environments. How-
ever, in many network security visualization tools, there could be hundreds of possible
interaction combinations for a user to navigate [71]. For a novice user possessing little
or no expertise, executing a complex task using a visualization tool, such as identifying a
network attack, becomes difficult. Thus, a novice user may need assistance in performing
the correct sequence of interactions. To solve this problem, a system was developed that
could be used as a module within the FRE3DS framework for 3D visualization tools to
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recommend both visualizations and interactions for a network-based attack using a recom-
mendation algorithm. This system recognizes similar patterns found in current and histor-
ical interaction data from a group of expert users and recommends a set of interactions to
a novice user. NAVSEC uses the nearest-neighbor machine learning algorithm to identify
unknown attacks. Current user’s and a group of expert users’ past behavior are studied
to assist users in determining a visualization to use for identifying an attack and to aid a
novice user in navigating and manipulating 3D visualizations for network security appli-
cations. This assistance in navigation leads to the reduction of interactions used to detect
various network activity and guides a novice user to certain objectives such as detecting a
stealthy network-based attack.
As discussed in chapter 3, NAVSEC takes advantage of FRE3DS’ IL (portrayed in Fig-
ure 20). Within the IL, coordinates (C1i ... C1N) are generated from n different inputs (i).
The input could be multiple points of contact from a user’s fingers on a multi-touch device.
The input is stored in a buffer and the InterSec Module pulls data from the input using First-
In-First-Out (FIFO) queuing method. Next, based on the type of input, InterSec translates
the coordinates into interactions or gestures and executes the interactions or gestures within
SSG. In parallel, the NAVSEC receives the interaction from the InterSec Module and ap-
plies the recommender system to the FRE3DS framework. Finally, the NAVSEC module
sends a recommended interaction or set of interactions to the SSG.
6.0.6 An Introduction to Nearest-neighbor Approach for NAVSEC
Navigating within a 3D visualization for network security applications can be difficult be-
cause a large amount of network data is portrayed in a screen-size visualization. Moreover,
visualizations offer a limited amount of navigational information [59]. There are hundreds
of details to track and one mistake could result in a misinterpretation of an attack that is be-
ing visualized. In addition, different interactions could be utilized to navigate through a 3D
environment to extend the visualization space. For instance, possible interactions include
zooming in and out of the visualization, rotating about a pivot point, panning, or shifting
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Figure 20: NAVSEC and InterSec modules within the FRE3DS framework.
the camera view of the visualization environment. Another interaction used to extend the
3D environment is the addition of a 2-axes plane that plots other network attributes such
as average packet size vs. total number of packets. Within FRE3DS, NAVSEC, collects
sequences of interactions from a group of expert users and stores them into a database.
The active user’s current and past interactions are also collected. The nearest-neighbor ap-
proach, using cosine similarity, generates both suggested visualizations and next interaction
for a novice user based on the collected interactions. Through the usage of NAVSEC, users
(specifically novice users who are exposed to unfamiliar visualizations) are recommended
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possible interactions to extend 3D visualizations and become aware of interaction options
to detect attacks more effectively in their future use.
As mentioned previously and shown in Figure 21, NAVSEC applies the nearest-neighbor
approach [59] to an active (current) user’s recent set of interactions at instance t (state of
the active user) for an attack (e.g., DoS or an advanced stealthy port scan meant to bypass
a firewall or subvert an IDS) as denoted by the square. Instance t is calculated using the
active user’s current set of interactions. At instance t=0, an initial visualization is presented
to an active user. This visualization could be a representation of real-time network data or
an offline network dataset from a packet capture file. From this initial visualization, the
user can speculate an attack, but the system needs more information to help the user inves-
tigate the attack further. By choosing an attack type portrayed as a button located in the
tools palette on the visualization interface, the user provides NAVSEC with a starting point.
As the active user interacts with the visualization tool, the active user’s set of interactions
at instance t is compared to sets of interactions from expert users. In my work, I assume
expert users are knowledgable and successful in producing visualizations from a set of in-
teractions to identify an attack. Each set of interactions is a sequence of interactions for
the same type of attack speculated by the active user as denoted by triangles in Figure 21.
The system picks the nearest-neighbor and recommends this set of interactions as denoted
by the arrows until a visualization goal is reached. The recommendation system uses the
number of occurrences of each interaction type between a novice user and group of expert
users and computes the similarity to a set of novice user’s interactions using a cosine sim-
ilarity function. The visualization goal in Figure 21 is a visualization used by expert users
to identify or detect a speculated attack.
Furthermore, if an active user does not perform any interactions (e.g., instance t=0),
but wishes to be recommended a set of interactions, the most commonly-used sequence of
interactions produced by the group of expert users for an attack are used.
Depending on the active user’s behavior, NAVSEC dynamically generates the most
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Figure 21: Nearest-neighbor approach for a network attack.
similar set of interactions or visualization from a group of expert users. My intention
for this system is to recommend a set of interactions used to extend or manipulate the
visualization space for an active user to be guided along a path to reach a visualization goal
at instance n. NAVSEC only recommends how a novice user can reach a speculated attack
based on expert users’ interactions and does not promise to find any attack.
6.0.7 3D Network Security and the Application of NAVSEC
Existing 3D visualizations have been created to visualize data using techniques such as
iconic tree structures, bar charts [45, 46], and 3D scatter plots [5]. For example, PortVis
[42] is a visualization tool that aids in detecting large-scale network security events and
port activity. Also, NetBytes Viewer [43] visualizes the historical network flow data per
port of an individual host machine or subnet on a network using a 3D impulse graph plot.
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These tools only consider the 4-tuple: source IP, destination IP, source port, and destina-
tion port. Thus, these tools show a small amount of detail and only display the counts of
activities rather than the activities themselves. This lack of detail could lead to a misin-
terpretation of network attacks. Also, NetBytes Viewer is static; hence, new visualizations
cannot be derived from NetBytes Viewer to detect interesting attacks. However, with inte-
gration of NAVSEC and NetBytes Viewer, we can provide a foundation to recommend new
visualizations and help novice users of NetBytes to detect more types of attacks.
Furthermore, research has been performed in detecting unknown large-scale Internet
attacks including internet worms, DDoS attacks and network scanning activities using a
parallel coordinate system [28]. Parallel coordinate attack visualization (PCAV) [28] uses
hash algorithms to detect nine graphical signatures, and a parallel 3D coordinate system for
network security (P3D) [6] extends the visualization space by introducing a stereoscopic
awareness region mechanism using 3D glasses to highlight important data and expand the
visualization to help prevent occlusions. NAVSEC can be uniquely integrated as a mod-
ule to reduce the amount of interactions used in these visualizations without any guidance.
Moreover, NAVSEC focuses on aiding novice users by examining the interaction space
rather than the visualization space. NAVSEC addresses these limitations by visualizing
and incorporating more data, allowing it to help uniquely characterize port scans and fur-
ther understand scanning activity. In addition, NAVSEC uses a knowledge base of expert
users so that as different attacks occur, the most similar visualization could be dynamically
generated. As more expert users utilize the system, thereby increasing the expert user in-
teraction database, the most similar visualization to the active user’s behavior may evolve
over time.
The only ”intelligent” visualization system within network security applications that
has been proposed is NIMBLE [72]. In [72] , Rasmussen introduces NIMBLE, an incident
management system through visualization. NIMBLE calculates the similarity for given
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IDS alerts and historical alerts classified by network administrators. His results show im-
proved network analyst’s accuracy in defending the network with the tool’s visual display
and the given recommendations. His primary visualization focuses on correlated IDS out-
put rather than network traffic. In contrast, NAVSEC is more comprehensive as it also ac-
counts for understanding of attacks meant to mislead the user or subvert an IDS. NAVSEC
can also ”walk” users through a network attack analysis.
6.1 System Design
As mentioned in the Introduction, the goal of this research is to present a novice user with
recommendations of a set of user interface (UI) interactions that produce visualizations
that aid in effectively navigating within 3D visualizations. This set of interactions is shown
as a textual list or as a visualization produced by automatically performing the listed in-
teractions. NAVSEC provides the textual interactions as an option for the user to iterate
tasks while referencing the textual list for more detail on the expert’s reasoning in creating
a visualization. This feature could also be conducive in education/training situations for
allowing instructors to show practical examples of various expert users’ identification of
attacks. However, showing a visualization rather than textual interactions allows the active
user to view a quick and accessible visualization from an expert user by simply clicking a
button. This feature reduces the amount of the interactions needed from an active user.
The recommender system was designed as a modular web-based system, which can
incorporate various machine learning techniques (e.g., nearest neighbors, support vector
machines, neural networks) as modules. A developer can extend the recommender system
by developing a custom module to meet their specific requirements. As a result, this mod-
ular approach increases the flexibility of the system. Furthermore, the system allows for
multiple expert and active users to connect to a centralized web-server. This system could
potentially be expanded to accommodate load balancing and redundancy, common tech-
niques used for reliability and scalability. Moreover, NAVSEC can support different expert
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Figure 22: System design of NAVSEC.
user communities such as colleagues in a small security organization where resources are
limited or training inexperienced military personnel. Additionally, NAVSEC user interface
is seemingly unobtrusive; it does not force the user to respond to recommendations before
continuing their work. To implement this system, a distributed system was deployed for
both expert users and novice users. A light-weight visualization tool is deployed to each
user with the NAVSEC module installed and the module connects to a centralized server for
computation. As illustrated in Figure 22, the NAVSEC system consists of 4 components:
Active User, Expert User Community, Interaction Database, and Recommender. Each of
these components are expounded upon in the following sub-sections.
6.1.1 Active User
The active user (i.e., current user) is defined as the one navigating the visualization tool
with the NAVSEC module installed. In my work, the active user is a novice that may be
confused regarding the next set of interactions ( and resulting visualization) to be performed
to successfully identify an attack.
66
6.1.2 Expert User Community
The Expert User Community is a set of users with significant experience in the network
security and visualization fields. An expert user could be colleagues in a security organi-
zation or IT department. These users interact with a visualization tool (e.g., P3D [6]), to
create visualizations used to detect or identify an attack on a network. Expert users catego-
rize the visualizations by clicking on an attack category button located in the tools palette.
In this work, an expert is assumed as someone who has sufficient knowledge to perform
the correct sequence of interactions to detect an attack. The sequence of interactions (i.e.,
zoom, pan, translate, add plane) for each expert user and categorized attack is recorded and
sent to the centralized Interaction Database prior to any active user activity.
6.1.3 Interaction Database
The Interaction Database is a collection of interaction sequences. Also, the Interaction
Database stores the amount of interactions input by both expert and active users for each
attack. The stored amount of interactions are used by the Recommender component to
compute the popular set of visualizations and interactions for specific network attacks. The
Recommender also receives interactions as input from an active user via HTTP requests and
stores them into the Interaction Database. The data from the Interaction Database contains
the interaction identification number which is a number that maps to the type of interaction
performed by the active user. This identification number is used to convert the sequence
of interactions into readable text. The Recommender performs a cosine similarity analysis
on the active user data and suggests a set of interactions to find a particular type of attack.
The next sub-section further discusses how cosine similarity analysis is used to compare
an active user’s set of interactions to a group of expert users’ interactions and then finds
the most similar set of interactions from the group of expert users. This set of interactions
can be used to generate visualizations for the active user. After the active user performs
the suggested sequence of interactions, the sequence is sent and stored in the Interaction
Database for future use.
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Figure 23: Design of recommendation engine.
6.1.4 Recommender
The Recommender parses the data contained in the Interaction Database and computes a
set of interactions for recommendation to an active user in real-time as listed in Algorithm
1. This computation is performed by the Recommendation Engine (Figure 23).
The Recommendation Engine uses two inputs: the interaction history of expert users
and the current history of interactions of an active user. Once the two inputs are generated,
the Algorithm 1 ComputeSetOfRecommendations( ) is used to calculate a recommended set
of interactions from the two inputs. The algorithm for recommending a set of interactions
is divided into three parts: formulate an interaction vector, compute a similarity matrix, and
recommend a set of interactions.
The recommender system formulates an interaction vector (lines 2-8) by using the total
number of occurrences n j of the interaction type j for the kth attack session sk. The interac-
tion type is the categorized interaction performed by the user to manipulate a visualization
such as add left plane, zoom, rotate, add right plane. An attack session is a sequence of
interactions to visualize an attack. Furthermore, a user can perform multiple sessions for
a type of specific attack a. For example, an expert user could visualize 10 port scan at-
tacks (K=10) where k is the session identifier and K is the total number of sessions for an
attack. As given in Equation 1, each user’s number of occurrences n j is tabulated into an
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interaction vector ~vk for the kth session where k is the unique identifier for each session.
In Equation 1, n j is the summation of each unique occurrence i of interaction type j for
attack session sk. Each interaction type j corresponds to the position of interaction vector
~vk where J is the total number of interaction types. Thus, the total number of dimensions
within an interaction vector ~vk is equivalent to the total number of interaction types J. Each
interaction vector ~vk for all expert users is stored in the Interaction Database.
~vk = [n0 n1 · · · nJ−1]
where n j =
I−1∑
i=0
i j f or attack session sk.
(1)
Next, the cosine similarity function was used to produce a similarity matrix (Equation
2). This similarity matrix is derived from comparing the active user’s interaction vector ~vh
to each expert user’s interaction vector ~vk for all sessions.
NAVSEC’s algorithm loops through (lines 9-13) a set of interaction vectors for each
session within the attack. Each interaction vector ~vk of an expert user performs a similar
distance function such as cosine similarity to an active user current session ~vh. The resulting
value Mk is stored into a user similarity matrix ~M. The resulting similarity values stored in
~M ranges from 0-1. The value 0 means that vectors are orthogonal to each other and the
set of interactions is not related. The value 1 means the vectors are collinear or the set of
interactions is similar. Thus, values close to 1 indicate ~vh is similar to ~vk.




Finally, a set of interactions (lines 14-20) were recommended by computing the closest
score to 1 after taking the maximum value of similarity matrix ~M. Each position in the
similarity matrix ~M is mapped to a session identification number k and sequence of actions
can be determined by selecting the sequence of interactions from the session identification
number. Then, the sequence of interactions from the expert user session can be sent back
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Algorithm 1 ComputeSetOfRecommendations( )
1: begin
2: % Formulate an interaction vector vk.
3: ~vk = [n0 n1 · · · nJ−1]
4: for (i = 0 to total Number Interactionssk )
5: if (typeO f Interation(i) == j)
6: return n j + +
7: end if
8: end for
9: % Compute a similarity matrix M.
10: ~M = [M0 M1 · · · MK−1]
11: for (k = 0 to K − 1)
12: Mk ← cos(~vk, ~vh)
13: return Mk
14: % Recommend a set of interactions.
15: for (k = 0 to K − 1)




20: return Interaction sequencesk
21: end
to the active user as the recommended set of interactions.
6.2 System Implementation
NAVSEC was implemented as a module for a Parallel 3D coordinate system (P3D) [6] and
illustrate the functionality of NAVSEC with a use-case scenario for advanced stealthy port
scans. P3D is used because unlike most 3D counterparts this tool has no theoretical limit
in the number of network parameters that can be visualized. Therefore it is better able
to detect visualization attacks [40] unlike a 2D/3D scattered plot matrix [28], which uses
stereoscopic 3D support and interactive techniques such as zooming and panning. P3D uses
2D YZ planes of network attributes positioned along the x-axis and shows the relationship
of the attributes using colored lines. Each colored line represents the type of connection
(e.g., TCP, UDP). To incorporate NAVSEC into P3D, I extended P3D by modifying the
interaction layer of FRE3DS [9] for both expert and active users. As discussed, NAVSEC
produces a recommended set of interactions or visualizations. This set of recommended
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interactions are displayed in a web-based interface that the user can refer to when conve-
nient. NAVSEC can also be displayed as a peripheral tool palette located within the P3D
user interface. This tools palette contains a list of network attacks in the form of buttons.
If a user clicks on an attack, the suggested visualization is presented to the user.
NAVSEC contains a client-side C++ component that is integrated as a module to send
GET HTTP request of interactions to the server-side application. The server-side uses an
Application Programming Interface (API) to receive HTTP requests. The NAVSEC API
is developed using Codeigniter, a PHP framework used for rapid web development [73].
Codeigniter uses a Model-View-Controller architecture design to assist in code reusability
so that the NAVSEC module code can be easily integrated with other visualization tools.
6.3 Use Case Analysis
In this section, NAVSEC is evaluated with a use-case scenario for stealthy port scanning
attacks. Stealthy port scanning attacks were used because these attacks are commonly used
by attackers to bypass firewalls, subvert IDSs, and could often be misinterpreted by network
administrators. Next, discussion is presented about a novice user’s confusion between vi-
sualizing a stealthy port scan disguised as a FTP scan and a file transfer using multiple
concurrent TCP connections. A concurrent FTP transfer occurs when a client and server
creates multiple TCP connections to increase total throughput of the file transfers. This
network activity is commonly implemented by clicking the ”Enable Concurrent/Multiple
Connections for transfers” in FTP clients (e.g, Filezilla [74]). Through the FRE3DS frame-
work, NAVSEC demonstrates that it can help avoid this confusion. The number of inter-
actions performed when NAVSEC is enabled vs. disabled is also evaluated. Finally, the
convergence of interactions to a high similarity score is shown, which denotes that an active
user set of interactions approaches an expert user’s set of interactions.
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6.3.1 Stealthy Port Scanning Use-Case
Stealthy port scanning is a network attack used to discover exploitable communication
channels by probing for vulnerable services in a form that goes undetected by traditional
intrusion detection systems. Most network scanner tools contain the ability to forge var-
ious packets (e.g., RST packets) from a spoofed source and destination IP addresses as
though they were coming from protected hosts behind the firewall. Also, a highly skilled
attacker can perform scans that emulate legitimate network traffic. Although current visu-
alization IDSs detect most scanning activity, more advanced attackers can perform stealthy
port scanning attacks to subvert IDSs. Therefore, network administrators must distinguish
stealthy attacks from legitimate network traffic.
As shown in Figure 24, a concurrent FTP file transfer of ten 20 Megabyte files us-
ing Filezilla [74] on the Windows Operation System (OS) is simulated. The source IP
57.25.6.30 is attempting a TCP connection from 10 ephemeral ports (50332-50341) to 10
ephemeral ports (53829-53837, 53850) on a destination IP 57.25.6.100. The source IP is
also attempting to connect from 18 ephemeral source ports to port 21 (default port for FTP
service) on 57.25.6.100. These connections occur because two connections are used to
initiate a FTP connection and send FTP commands for each data transfer. By examining
this initial visualization, both a novice and expert user could suspect that an attacker is per-
forming a stealthy scan from 10 multiple consecutive source ports to 10 destination ports
rapidly, but below most IDSs scanning rate thresholds.
However, since an expert is familiar with P3D and network security, the expert can
examine the network data further. The expert extends the visualization by performing in-
teractions with the P3D interface such as color coding the lines to specific network protocol
to keep the consistency of the visualization and adding a left plane with the z-axis as total
size of packets in a TCP flow and the y-axis as number of packets in a TCP flow. By exam-
ining this TCP flow, the expert can determine the number of packets and size of packets in
a TCP connection to evaluate if the connection is actually a port scan. Figure 25 shows an
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Figure 24: A potential stealthy port scan.
Figure 25: P3D [6] Multiple concurrent FTP file transfer.
extension of P3D (i.e., an expert added an additional plane) where the average size of the
packets and the number of packets sent by the source ephemeral ports are high (1438 bytes
and 147304 packets, respectively). Since a large amount of data is sent, the source node
can be interpreted as a potential FTP connection in passive mode with multiple concurrent
connections to increase FTP server’s throughput rather than a port scan.
On the contrary, if the total number of packets in a TCP connection and an average
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Figure 26: P3D [6] steathy scan.
packet size from the source are low, (one packet) as illustrated in Figure 26, the visual-
ization is potentially a stealthy port scan. An attacker can send packets with data in the
payloads to further confuse the administrator. However, an expert user could further evalu-
ate the scenario by adding a plane to show the number of ACK packets versus RST packets.
If no ACK packets are being sent from the server, then a legitimate connection has not been
established.
An expert user can successfully distinguish attacks from legitimate traffic by expanding
and manipulating the P3D environment. However, the ability to successfully and efficiently
expand this visualization requires the user to possess an advanced background in network
security and experience with the P3D visualization system. From the initial analysis in
Figure 24, the novice may view multiple connections to multiple destination ports and mis-
takenly assume the network activity is a port scan. Moreover, due to the novice user’s basic
visualization knowledge, the novice may not have the knowledge to extend the visualiza-
tion. Using the NAVSEC system as explained in Section 7.2, the novice can use the expert
user’s suggested visualization by clicking the ”port scan” button in the attack tools palette.
By clicking on this button, P3D uses the recommender algorithm and input from a group
of expert users via the NAVSEC module to produce the most recommended visualization
based on the cosine similarity function.
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Figure 27: Convergence of interactions.
6.4 User Interaction Convergence Evaluation
In this section, the convergence of five sets of arbitrary instances of an active user session is
shown (Figure 27). As discussed in Section 1 ”Nearest Neighbor Approach for NAVSEC”,
an instance is denoted by the current set of interactions that was performed by the active
user. For each instance, the recommended next interaction is performed using NAVSEC.
Next, the maximum similarity score is computed after each recommended instance and
plotted as shown in Figure 27. If the maximum similarity score continues to converge
towards the value 1 after each consecutive step in the set of performed interactions, then
the visualization produced by the active user is becoming similar to a visualization used to
identify or detect a suspected attack by an expert user. Thus, as illustrated in Figure 21,
NAVSEC is guiding an active user to a visualization completed by an expert user.
As shown in Figure 27, five sessions from active users are arbitrarily chosen from a
group of active sessions. These sessions are compared to 40 emulated interaction vectors
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performed by expert users. Each interaction vector contains a set of 30 types of interactions
(e.g., zoom out, zoom in, rotate, add left plane, add line glyphs). The line graph shows that
as the set of interaction increases, each active session converges towards a value of 1 for
the similarity score. The highest value is .95. This result suggests that with the use of
NAVSEC, visualizations for the P3D tool converges towards an expert user’s interaction
set which can ultimately help novice users detect attacks.
6.5 User Study on Efficacy of NAVSEC
Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected from 15 users (13 males and 2 fe-
male) using NAVSEC. These users completed a pre-survey used to understand each user’s
expertise. From the survey, 10 users were denoted as novice users (basic knowledge in
networking concepts or less than one year of experience), and 5 users were expert users
(advanced knowledge with 3+ years of experience in a network security field). With each
user, a total of 18 trials (9 trials with NAVSEC enabled and 9 trials with NAVSEC disabled)
were recorded using emulated networking scenarios (e.g., DoS, DDoS, port scans, ftp trans-
fer, disguised FTP transfer). Before the trial period, each participant was asked to perform
a warm-up session to verify their expertise. In the warm-up session, the participants were
asked to identify specific network attacks using P3D. For each trial of the experiment, the
sequence of interactions used to complete this task was recorded. In total, we individually
recorded 135 trials for 9 different scenarios (depicted in Table 4). For qualitative analysis,
a post-survey using 5-point Likert scales were gathered.
The goal of our experiment was to compare the performance of NAVSEC vs. non-
NAVSEC (NAVSEC module disabled). The performance was measured by examining the
average number of interactions and similarity values between novice and expert users. The
similarity is determined by computing the maximum cosine similarity between a vector for
a set of interactions performed by a novice user and the vector performed by an expert user.
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6.5.1 Interaction Analysis
As shown in Table 4, NAVSEC outperforms non-NAVSEC by showing a 24.8 % (average)
reduction in the number of interactions. This reduction occurs because novice users could
verify the next interaction by looking at an expert user’s next interaction or next sequence
of interactions. Furthermore, with NAVEC enabled, the user can view the sequence of
interactions performed by an expert user, which helps prevent the novice user from per-
forming interactions in error. Under conditions with background noise, the result show
as much as a 33.7 % percentage increase (DoS with background noise) in the number of
interactions. However, although the number of interactions increased, the response time
also increased. This result is partly due to the fact that NAVSEC sends updates to the user
by querying the NAVSEC recommendation engine in 5 second increments. Also, since the
NAVSEC prototype was located on a separate monitor while user testing, the response time
was also affected by the user looking away to another screen. The issue could be addressed
by implementing a near realtime system where NAVSEC feedback is embedded within the
same interface as the visualization tool.
Table 4: Average number of interactions for NAVSEC and non-NAVSEC.
Scenario NAVSEC non-NAVSEC Percentage increase
Port scan 19.5 16.2 16.92
DoS 25.02 20.4 18.47
Port Confusion with DDoS and
Scan
48.64 38.2 21.46
Port source confusion attack 50.4 38.3 24.01
DDoS using SYN Flood 60.2 47.9 20.43
DoS with background noise 63.4 42.8 32.49
2 port scans with large noise 67 44.4 33.73
FTP disguised attack 65.02 50.6 22.18
Legitimate traffic with no at-
tacks
83 63.6 23.37
AVG 53.58 40.27 24.84
6.5.2 Similarity Analysis
Comparisons of the similarity of expert and novice user vectors reveal significant differ-
ences between NAVSEC and non-NAVSEC. As mentioned previously, a value of 0 denotes
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that the set of interactions is not related between an expert user and novice user. The value
1 means the set of interactions is similar. As shown in Table 5, the average similarity of
novice users using NAVSEC shows a 21.04 % increase in similarity to the expert users
compared to that of the novice users using non-NAVSEC. This result implies that with
NAVSEC enabled, novice users perform more interactions similar to an expert than per-
forming interactions with non-NAVSEC. However, although NAVSEC can guide a novice
user to a visualization of an expert user, the qualitative analysis shows that some novice
users could not understand the purpose of the next interaction. In these scenarios, users
began blindly performing steps, which does not contribute to the comprehension of the the
visualization system.
Table 5: Average similarity to expert users for NAVSEC and non-NAVSEC.
Scenario NAVSEC non-NAVSEC Percentage decrease
Port scan 0.75 0.81 7.52
DoS 0.80 0.86 6.98
Port Confusion with DDoS
and Scan
0.68 0.87 21.84
Port source confusion attack 0.73 0.85 14.12
DDoS using SYN Flood 0.79 0.90 12.22
DoS with background noise 0.56 0.86 34.88
2 port scans with large noise 0.59 0.82 28.05
FTP disguised attack 0.64 0.87 26.44
Legitimate traffic with no at-
tacks
0.42 0.67 37.31
AVG 0.66 0.83 21.04
6.5.3 Qualitative Feedback
Participants filled out a post-experiment questionnaire using 5-point Likert scale to rate the
effectiveness of the NAVSEC system. Furthermore, they were asked to comment on the
improvements and enhancements for the NAVSEC system. These participants suggested
that a description explaining why the interactions were performed be provided. Using this
feedback, the NAVSEC system could be improved by attaching a comment to a sequence
of interactions. Our findings show that 60 percent of novice users rated NAVSEC as very
high easy-to-use and 40 % of the users rated NAVSEC as high ease-to-use. It is also noted
78
Figure 28: Distribution of responses to question: ”How do you rate the ease-of-use of the
NAVSEC system?”.
that a post-survey’s open response mentioned that the NAVSEC could be distracting for
scenarios where a decision for a network could be determined without NAVSEC enabled.




INTERSEC: AN INTERACTION SYSTEM FOR NETWORK
SECURITY APPLICATIONS
As mentioned in Chapter 6, navigating within a 3D visualization for network security ap-
plications can be difficult because a large amount of network data is portrayed in a screen-
size visualization. There are hundreds of details to track and different interactions must be
utilized to navigate through a 3D environment. Thus, a new module for the FRE3DS frame-
work, InterSec, was developed to provide a system for managing input gestures, tailored
specifically to network security, that would enable the reduction of interactions to detect
and identify a network attack. Furthermore, using Natural User Interface ( NUI), InterSec
allows a single gesture to serve as multiple serial gestures to achieve faster response times.
7.1 Examining the Use of NUIs
A Natural User Interface (NUI) is an interface that enables a user to interact with a computer
in the same way the user interacts with the physical world, through using voice, hands,
and body. For example, instead of using a keyboard and a mouse, a NUI allows users to
speak to machines, stroke their surfaces using multi-touch systems, or perform gestures
in the air. One NUI technique uses gestures in 3D space to manipulate a visualization
environment. A gesture is a form of non-verbal communication in which visible bodily
actions communicate particular messages.
Within the FRE3DS framework, NUI interfaces such as multi-touch and hand gestures
are implemented using the Microsoft Kinect and 3M multi-touch monitor. The Kinect has
proven to be an effective NUI device for interacting with applications using hand gestures,
object recognition [75], and 3D scene generation [76]. The Kinect’s infrared projector,
infrared camera, and RGB camera are used to detect gestures in 3D space. Kinect’s in-
teractions are natural to the user and could be beneficial in assisting in the learnability of
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the network security visualizations. On the other hand, multi-touch systems supports all
ten fingers as input, providing many more input degrees of freedom than mouse inputs.
Research has shown that multi-touch interaction is about twice as fast as the mouse for
selection [20]. Research has also shown the direct-touch nature of multi-touch interfaces
accounts for 83% of a reduction in selection time and with additional training, bimanual
strokes (i.e., using two hands) outperform making strokes serially by 10-15%, which fur-
ther enhances the user’s efficiency [20]. InterSec adopts the usage of NUIs, commonly-used
in applications to minimize a user’s response time in identifying harmful network security
threats.
As shown in Figure 29, InterSec applies a gesture set from the NUIs to enable a user
to perform multiple interactions quickly and to discover a network attack (e.g., DoS or an
advanced stealthy port scan aiming to bypass a firewall or subvert an IDS). For example,
two users, User 1 and User 2 use a NUI, but User 2 uses the traditional WIMP interface.
By using a gesture set within InterSec, User 1 could use one gesture J1 to implement a set
of simultaneous interactions (I1, I2, I3) portrayed by User 2. In this scenario, our intention
is to reduce the number of individual interactions to assist in reducing the complexity of
analyzing network activity in 3D environments.
In addition, due to the nature of multi-touch interactions, the time required to perform
a gesture J1 could be less than a single interaction, I1, especially in the selection of tasks.
For example, assume a network administrator is attempting to discover problematic nodes
communicating via an Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channel within a botnet and decides to
send his findings to a colleague using a 3D visualization tool. Using InterSec, the network
administrator can use a NUI to perform a zoom/rotate interaction (a combination of zoom
and rotate) rather than rotate and zoom interaction in series on a WIMP interface. Thus, the
NUI would take one command instead of two separate commands and reduce the number
of interactions. In addition, once the network administrator finds the command and control
node, the network administrator may use a collaborative sharing gesture (e.g., four finger
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Figure 29: InterSec’s application on a NUI vs. WIMP interface.
swipe) to notify a colleague by sending a filtered packet capture attached to an email for
further investigation.
7.2 System Design and Implementation
As a recap, the InterSec module, as previously discussed in Chapter 6 and shown in Figure
20, is located in the IL of the FRE3DS framework. Within the IL, coordinates (C1i ... C1N)
from touch, mouse, or hand inputs are generated from input devices. The input is stored in
a buffer and the InterSec Module pulls the data from the input and converts the coordinates
into interactions or gestures, depending on the type of input device. The interactions are
passed through the InterSec process (as discussed later in the chapter), which could produce
a set of commands or interactions based-on the gesture. Finally, these commands are then
executed by the SSG and passed to the NAVSEC module.
InterSec takes advantage of direct-touch and bimanual input from state-of-the-art NUI
technologies to aid in effectively navigating within 3D visualizations for network security
applications. InterSec could be integrated into existing visualizations tools or used to pro-
mote new alternative NUI designs. Furthermore, a NUI system is presented, which helps
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developers of network security tools to build and manage gestures that require the coor-
dination of multiple fingers and body limbs. The system uses NUI sensor devices (e.g.,
Kinect and touch monitor) so that the network administrator could use the advantages of
devices with a high degree of freedom unlike traditional WIMP technologies.
Additionally, in order to allow for efficient monitoring and detection of network traffic
and to evaluate its efficacy, InterSec has been designed and implemented. InterSec uses
the FRE3DS framework [9] to convert gestures into a series of interactions for visualizing
network attacks. The InterSec system consists of 4 stages: Sensor, Gesture Recognition,
Gesture Mapping, Visualization Manipulation as illustrated in Figure 30. First, the raw
data is sent from the NUI sensors (e.g., Kinect) to the Gesture-based detection system as
input. Our detection system is adopted from GestureWorks [8], an HCI engine that contains
pre-selected gestures, which produce the gesture input for gesture mapping. Each input is
loaded as a plugin to the system in which there are a number of input devices that can be
used with InterSec to produce the input data. For example, a LEAP Motion [64] plugin
could be installed and interact with other 3D visualization tools in a physical 3D space.
In our research, Kinect was used as the NUI sensor to input and to send the raw data as a
series of gestures performed by larger body limbs (e.g., hands, arms, head). Through the
use of the NUI sensor from Kinect 3-point skeleton tracking tool (Figure 31), Kinect tracks
the motions of body limbs from a remote space to navigate through a 3D environment.
Kinect enables the user to perform several gestures simultaneously in order to convey
multiple tasks at one time with fewer interactions. Unlike traditional WIMP technologies,
which possess a single mouse cursor with only two spatial degrees of freedom, Kinect al-
lows the user to employ body-motion gestures to perform more complex tasks in less time.
During the Gesture Recognition stage, the input from the NUI sensor is converted into a
gesture. After the gesture is recognized within the Gesture Recognition stage, the Task
Mapper compares the gesture to a group of gestures in a relational database management
system (RDMS) during the Gesture Mapping stage. If a match exists, the gesture is mapped
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Figure 30: System design of InterSec.
to a task such as performing packet capture filtering. Once the gesture is recognized, the
task is performed by filtering the captured data as follows: IP, Average Packet Size, Source
and Destination Port, IP ID, Fragmentation bit, Timestamp, and TCP header flags such
as SYN, FIN, URG, and PSH, and ACK. Common tasks for an administrator such as ex-
tracting relevant data through packet capture filtering, as opposed to storing entire network
packets, is vital to the reduction of data sizes and results in more efficient data manage-
ment. Finally, the Visualization Manipulation stage extracts and filters relevant parameters
from the packets and performs a sequence of interactions. In some cases, if the interactions
are independent, the interactions could be dispatched onto multiple processing threads to
increase efficiency and further reduce response time.
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Figure 31: Kinect’s [7] 3-point skeleton tracking tool
7.3 Gesture Set
In this sub-section, a sample gesture set from the GestureWorks [8] system is introduced
and used in InterSec (Figure 32). The sample gesture set is used specifically for a network
security analyst to reduce the number of interactions performed. As a result, response time
of the user could be reduced. Currently, no tool exists, for network security administrators
that proposes NUI gestures to reduce response times in 3D environments. A sample gesture
set is as follows:
7.3.1 Five finger flick
Five finger flick employs five fingers of a single hand to be placed on the visualization
rendering of the network and the motion of the fingers accelerates immediately before the
fingers are released from the interface. This gesture denotes collaborative sharing between
a user and a colleague. This gesture is important when a new attack has been detected
because the Five Finger Flick can be used to quickly send a filtered packet capture file via
email to a colleague or supervisor for further investigation.
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7.3.2 Two finger rotate/zoom
Two finger rotate/zoom combines both the rotate and zoom gestures in order to quickly
manipulate the visualization environment to produce fewer interactions than two separate
gestures.
7.3.3 Four finger hold
Four finger hold denotes four fingers touching the interface for a set period of time. These
four touch points created on a multi-touch screen produces a visualization window. This
visualization can be used as a filter mechanism to show only the packets that are visually
shown in the selected visualization window. This allows users to quickly display pcap data
of interest and filter unwanted pcap files in one gesture.
7.3.4 Lock one and 2 finger flick
Lock one and 2 finger flick refers to the selection of a visual data set using a single finger
and flicking downward with two fingers. Once the user flicks down, InterSec selects the
TCP flow and runs a companion tool, such as Wireshark, for the TCP flow data in order to
investigate the textual data in greater detail.
InterSec uses the C++ Object Oriented Model-View-Controller paradigm for higher
modularity and extensibility in the 3D visualization tools. We used a custom class using the
Microsoft SDK. To render the raw data, we used an interaction testbed on the Kinect device
and 3M’s multi-touch monitor as shown in Figure 8. While using Kinect, we converted the
data to gesture data using Kinect for Windows SDK. Kinect sensor data contains data from
a four-element linear microphone array, IR emitter, and two cameras that deliver depth
information, color images, and skeleton tracking data. For the multi-touch workstation,
we used a 3M 32-inch monitor, which supports Capacitive Touch Technology (CTT) of up
to 20 fingers. The multi-touch workstation is useful for collaboration of multiple network
administrators on the same interface.
InterSec was implemented as a module of the FRE3DS framework and the functionality
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Figure 32: NUI Gesture Set for Network Security Applications [8]
of InterSec is illustrated with use-case scenarios for analyzing a compromised host on the
network using the Parallel 3D coordinate system (P3D) [6]. As discussed earlier, P3D is
used because unlike most 3D counterparts, this tool has no theoretical limit in the number
of network parameters that can be visualized. Therefore, P3D is able to better detect vi-
sualization attacks [40] in comparison to a 2D/3D scattered plot matrix [28], which uses
stereoscopic 3D support and interactive techniques such as zooming and panning. To incor-
porate InterSec into P3D, P3D was extended by the modification of the interaction layer of
the Framework for Rendering Enhanced 3D Stereoscopic Visualization (FRE3DS) [9]. Us-
ing FRE3DS, network administrators can easily and quickly develop various visualizations
to efficiently investigate data.
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7.4 Use Case Analysis
In this section, InterSec is evaluated based on a real-world network attack data collected
from the honeynet project. Specifically, the number of interactions is examined to perform
tasks using mouse-keyboard vs. multi-touch interactions for P3D [6]. Also, the evalua-
tion method assumes the model for determining the number of interactions by an error-free
expert user. Although the user is practically error-proned, this model can be used as a
preliminary indicator for determining how long it takes to perform a task, specifically a
network attack. An expert is a user that knows the network task domain well and knows
how to perform all the tasks that need to be completed. For evaluation, a live network data
adopted from the Honeynet project’s 2010 Forensic Challenge is used. The honeynet pcap
portrayed a ”LSASS buffer overflow”, which caused a vulnerability (CVE-2003-0533), ex-
ploited by the Sasser worm. The attacker (source IP 98.114.205.102) established a TCP
connection with the victim or honeypot (192.150.11.111) on Microsoft-ds port 445 and
exploits the victim using the Windows Local Security Authority (LSA) Remote Procedure
Call (RPC) service. From this exploit, the attacker opens a new port on the socket listen-
ing on port 1957 with a command shell bound to it. Finally, the victim initiated an FTP
connection to the attacker and the attacker sent commands to the victim to download the
malware. This scenario is beneficial because it is commonly used by attackers. Although
the exploit commonly exists, we believe the methods for analysis could be applied more
generally to new attacks and discoveries. Note that our intent of this work is to analyze the
method for discovering a new attack rather than analyzing the attack itself.
InterSec is analyzed based on 4 common tasks: 1) Discover peculiar network activity
(e.g., port scans). 2) Filter TCP flows. 3) Analyze IP/TCP header and TCP trace using a
Wireshark filter. 4) Report to a colleague or upper management for verification and further
investigation. These tasks are commonly used when visualizing network traffic. First, the
user uses Kinect’s 3-point skeleton tracking tool to configure and show the preferred visu-
alization while away from the monitor. Next, the user employs a sequence of interactions
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to discover peculiar network activity such as port scans or denial of service attacks. In
addition to these interactions, a user can also use InterSec to discover peculiar traffic by an-
alyzing the source IP, source port, destination IP, and destination port by using a translation
interaction. Next, the administrator can use two finger rotate/zoom interactions to view the
ports from a source IP. After the administrator finds a peculiar port, the user filters the TCP
data from a source IP using a four finger hold interaction. After the user filters the network
data, the network administrator performs a lock one and 2 finger flick to investigate the
TCP flow data and packet payloads in a supplement tool such as Wireshark (Figure 33).
If the user finds a binded shell or a malicious executable transfer, then the user performs a
five finger flick to send a filtered pcap file of the shell and/or executable to a colleague for
further analysis.
In Figure 34, the number of interactions for NUI vs. mouse/keyboard interactions per-
formed by an error-free expert user for each of the four tasks previously discussed are
shown. This number is examine by exploring the number of minimum combinations of
error-free interactions to successfully accomplish tasks. Each number along the x-axis in
the figure represents each task.
With InterSec, at least a 50 % reduction in the number of interactions compared to tra-
ditional mouse/keyboards interactions for analyzing a Windows LSA RPC buffer overflow
is shown. As a result, this reduction in interactions will significantly reduce a user’s re-
sponse time. A user’s response time refers to the time taken by a user to react to a given
visualization. In task 3 (Analyze IP/TCP header and TCP trace using a Wireshark filter),
InterSec shows a substantial interaction reduction from 32 mouse/keyboard interactions in
comparison to 5 NUI gestures using InterSec. This is partly due to the large amount of
interactions to open Wireshark, scroll to an interesting packet, and investigate the packet
payload. Using InterSec, these interactions could be replace with a few gestures. The anal-
ysis shows the number of interactions of a Windows LSA RPC buffer overflow analysis will
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Figure 33: P3D tool using InterSec’s NUI Interactions
be reduced from 55 mouse/keyboard interactions to 13 NUI interfaces using InterSec. Al-
though this analysis is error-free (i.e., no mistakes are performed by a user), our analysis is
expected to apply more generally to more practical error-proned scenarios. In error-proned
scenarios, a user performs non-optimal paths and introduces gestures that do not attribute
to the detection of an attack. If the error introduced is constant across WIMP interfaces and
NUIs, the reduction of interactions will still apply.
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Figure 34: Minimum interactions for discovery of LSASS buffer overflow
7.5 User Study on Efficacy of InterSec
In this section, InterSec and WIMP interfaces are evaluated utilizing user testing methods.
As previously mentioned, within the user testing, a user was presented with network secu-
rity scenarios from a 3D visualization tool such as P3D and the task completion time and
learnability were measured. The task completion time was measured by the recorded dif-
ference of the start and end time. Within user testing, two subsets of the users were asked
to complete tasks using a mouse and multi-touch system respectively. Next, these tasks
completion times of various users were compared.
Each scenario contains a 3D Parallel coordinate system using a WIMP interface or a
NUI interface from the InterSec system. With user testing, 200 network attack scenarios
are analyzed using InterSec to determine if InterSec validates the hypothesis of reducing
the number of interactions and increasing response rates. Each task is evaluated using the
timespan to complete each task. Also, both the number of user interactions and the se-
quence of interactions are measured. This data collection, in conjunction with post-survey
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responses provides valuable insights to understand the efficacy of the InterSec system. Sim-
ilar to to P3D evaluation, both quantitative and qualitative data were collected from partic-
ipant interactions with the user interface and the questionnaires, using the 5-point Likert
scales.
7.5.1 Response Time Analysis
For our lab-based evaluation, 15 different subjects were recruited (13 male and 2 female),
aged between 22 and 32 years (mean = 25, sd = 4.7) to explore multi-touch and NUI
conditions. We asked the subjects to analyze 9 network scenarios. Similar to the procedure
stated in section 5.4, we explained the task to the participants, asked each participant to sign
a consent form, and the participants were instructed the use of InterSec. We also provided
a list of gestures (provided in Figure 32) for both the WIMP and NUI experiments.
Table 6 lists the percentage increase in response times averaged over the 15 users. As
expected, the response times of the InterSec is reduced approximately by 27.20 % largely
due to large reduction in direct touch selection time and the multi-touch gesture set as
shown in previous literature [20].
Participants from the main study found that WIMP was easier to use on initial attempts
due to the familiarity of WIMP in other tools. However, as the participants became more
familiar with the NUI, their interaction with the NUI became more natural. For example,
when a user uses an interface on the first attempt, the ability of an interface to allow users
to accomplish a task takes significantly longer than the second attempt because the user is
unfamiliar with the visualization. During the warm-up sessions, our results shows that the
user was able to reduce response time by 23 % in 3 attempts using the NUI.
7.5.2 Interaction Analysis
During experimentation, the number of user interactions for each session was recorded
using programmable hooks. This data was used to determine the average number of user
interactions for each scenario using both InterSec and WIMP interfaces. As shown in
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Table 6: Average user response times of InterSec by scenario.
Scenario WIMP (s) InterSec (s) Percentage
Decrease (%)
Port scan 49.01 38.58 21.28
DoS 46.49 35.72 23.17
Port Confusion with DDoS and Scan 115.18 85.12 26.10
Port source confusion attack 125.67 80.72 35.77
DDoS using SYN Flood 126.95 87.86 30.79
DoS with background noise 182.86 132.24 27.68
2 Port Scans with large noise 180.69 132.24 26.81
FTP disguised attack 191.74 120.48 37.16
Legitimate traffic with no attacks 230.34 193.38 16.05
AVG 138.77 100.70 27.20
Table 7: Number of interactions of InterSec, on average.
Scenario WIMP InterSec Percentage
Decrease (%)
Port scan 19.50 13.40 31.28
DoS 25.02 18.20 27.26
Port Confusion with DDoS and Scan 48.64 32.20 33.80
Port source confusion attack 50.40 32.80 34.92
DDoS using SYN Flood 60.20 40.40 32.89
DoS with background noise 63.40 38.80 38.80
2 Port Scans with large noise 67.00 36.20 45.97
FTP disguised attack 65.02 55.60 14.49
Legitimate traffic with no attacks 83.00 70.60 14.94
AVG 53.58 37.58 30.48
Table 7, InterSec produces a 30.48 % (on average) reduction in the number of interactions
for InterSec over its WIMP counterpart. This reduction occurs because InterSec’s ability
to use one interaction that would require the user to perform multiple interactions within
WIMP interfaces. The result shows as much as a 45.97 % reduction for attacks (e.g., 2 Port
Scans with large noise) that require the user to perform many zooms and rotates because
InterSec can perform a zoom and rotate with one interaction.
To further investigate the number of interactions, users were asked to perform four tasks
(mentioned in Section 7.4) using both InterSec and WIMP interfaces. For each task, an
average of the total number of interactions of the users for both WIMP InterSec interfaces
was calculated. As denoted in Figure 35, on average, the number of interactions is reduced
by as much as 63 % for tasks that require the user to open Wireshark and apply filters.
This reduction occurs because the number of interactions the user performs to open tools
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Figure 35: Number of user interactions from LSASS buffer overflow tasks mentioned in
Section 7.4
.
such as Wireshark could be reduced to one interaction with InterSec. However, users found
that searching through packets within Wireshark was difficult on a multi-touch monitor
because the buttons were too small for touch interface. This observation is expected due
to Wireshark’s limited multitouch support. Wireshark developers could enhance the multi-
touch capabilities by integrating its UI with InterSec. The results show that the total average
reduction for the number of interactions is 45 % using the InterSec system in comparison
to its WIMP counterpart.
7.5.3 Qualitative Feedback
To conduct qualitative analysis, the participants were given 5-point Likert scale question-
naires to understand the ease-of-use of the InterSec system. As shown in Figure 36, 60
% of the users ranked the InterSec system as very high or as having a high ease-of-use.
Also, 40 % of the users ranked the system as having a neutral ease-of-use partly due to
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difficulties of remembering gestures and using tools (e.g., Wireshark) on the touch monitor
that is primarily designed for WIMP interfaces. The qualitative feedback from the study
revealed that some participants developed strategies for learning gestures. For example,
one participant used the imagery (four finger hold is like creating a window or frame with
your fingers). In some cases, participants found difficulty memorizing gestures and these
participants constantly referred to the cheat sheet. It is assumed that these participants did
not attach the gesture to a natural gesture like taking a picture or physically sliding a task to
a colleague using a five-finger swipe. This issue can be addressed by introducing a natural
example of why the gesture was chosen for a task. This method allows the user to attach a
natural action. For example, physically pushing a sheet of paper to a colleague is similar
to five finger swipe because in both cases, data is sent to another user. Also, during open
responses, some users mentioned potential arm fatigue for long term usage. Although the
experiment was performed on 32 inch multitouch display, the monitor could be reduce to
a smaller display to reduce moving the arms large distances. Also, the monitor could be
ergonomically positioned to a slight vertical tilt to further reduce arm strain.
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, we developed efficient interactions and 3D visualization techniques for a net-
work administrator to enhance situational awareness using stereoscopic 3D technologies,
reduce task completion time using a recommender system, decrease user error by increas-
ing the visualization space and increase learnability of complex visualizations for network
security applications by incorporating NUIs. These techniques utilize multi-dimensional
data in a format suitable for simplified human interpretation and analysis. Although there
have been several studies on 2D/3D visualization techniques for network analysis, there has
been little work on stereoscopic 3D techniques, NUI techniques and recommender systems
for network security visualization. The following four areas were investigated in this thesis
and conclusions for each of them are described in the Research Contributions subsection
(Section 8.1).
8.1 Research Contributions
8.1.1 Designing a Framework for Rendering Enhanced 3D Visualizations
In Chapter 3, the FRE3DS framework was presented for administrators to absorb and per-
ceive large amounts of visual information, particularly when the 3D senses were enabled
by binocular vision. Furthermore, it established a way to allow administrators to evalu-
ate the effects of emerging technologies in computer visualization and interaction. In this
thesis, the effects of the stereoscopic and NUI technologies were examined in network se-
curity applications. From this framework, 4 prototypes were developed and evaluated with
use-cases and usability testing.
8.1.2 3D Stereoscopic Vulnerability Assessment Tool (3DSVAT)
The 3DSVAT tool uses the FRE3DS framework to reveal vital vulnerability characteris-
tics of local area network data and determine correlations of vulnerability data between
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nodes. This is essential for strategically determining which node to patch first and rapidly
determining highly vulnerable nodes on networks. 3DSVAT rendered both monocular and
binocular depth cues to enhance the user’s experience, perform faster analysis of the net-
work vulnerability data, reduce clutter, and increase efficiency
8.1.3 Parallel 3D Coordinate Visualization (P3D)
P3D used the FRE3DS framework to understand and analyze scans or attacks used to mis-
lead and overwhelm the user analyzing large networks. P3D revealed vital scanning charac-
teristics of data and determined correlations between data and attacker nodes on a network.
P3D is essential for strategically determining distributed coordinated attacks. Specifically,
this thesis showed that when using P3D, it is less likely to obscure data through occlusion
attacks particularly meant to visually overwhelm the user.
8.1.4 NAVSEC Recommender System
In Chapter 6, NAVSEC was presented, and it was shown that it can assist users in navi-
gating 3D visualizations and to reduce the possible number of interactions within a visu-
alization. Although there have been several studies on 2D/3D visualization techniques for
network analysis, there has been little work on addressing the issue of navigation com-
plexity within these visualization techniques [40]. NAVSEC uses advanced visualization
recommender techniques based on a database of interaction sequences of an expert com-
munity to (1) enhance the novice user’s experience, (2) provide easier understanding of 3D
network security in complex visualization environments, and (3) perform faster analysis of
the network data thereby increasing efficiency. NAVSEC was implemented using P3D and
the FRE3DS framework [9] and vital characteristics of a node on a network were revealed.
Specifically, it was shown that using NAVSEC, novice users are less likely to be confused
when discovering advance attacks.
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8.1.5 Interaction System for Network Security
The use of novel interactions to analyze multidimensional data is discussed in Chapter 7.
Although there have been several studies on 2D/3D visualization techniques for network
analysis, there has been little work on interaction techniques aimed at understanding and
analyzing attacks. InterSec enables administrators to develop NUI gesture sets to reduce
the interactions performed on a 3D security tool and assist users in navigating in the 3D
visualizations. In addition, the interaction space was extended using InterSec and a ges-
ture set was implemented that was used to simulate multiple actions used to discover new
data. InterSec was used to reveal vital scanning characteristics of data and to determine
correlations between data and attacker nodes on a network.
8.2 Future Work
In the future, this work could be expanded to the IPv6 address space, implement more user
interactions in InterSec, and can be deployed into small organizations for a more exhaustive
user analysis. Other improvements are mentioned below.
8.2.1 Long Term User Study
The evaluation of user analysis in the current design is rather limited, and assumptions are
largely based on a small set of users. To further verify claims addressed in this thesis, the
FRE3DS framework could be deployed to a large number of users across multiple organi-
zations in the the network security field. To perform a widely distributed network of user
testing, the framework should be refined to address scalability (such as cloud computing
and load balancing) of the platform. In addition, to prepare for adoption from many users,
the framework must must be made available on multiple platforms (e.g., OSX, Windows,
and Linux).
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8.2.2 Effects of Multiple Visualization Designs
One of the biggest challenges in visualization is to address the best design for an network
incident. In this case, the best design refers to reduced response times, low error rates, and
allowing the users to gain new insights into a large dataset. Although the current design
evaluates stereoscopic conditions for one tool. The current design does not deal with the
evaluation of various tools under stereoscopic conditions. In the future, many different




Georgia Institute of Technology
Project Title: Information process of 3D parallel network scans
Principle Investigator: Dr. Raheen Beyah
Co-investigators: Troy Nunnally, Kulsoom Abdullah, Penyen Chi, Selcuk Uluagac
Consent title: Main 12/1/12v1
Research Consent Form
You are being asked to be a volunteer in a research study.
Purpose:
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the benefits of stereoscopic 3D in network security
applications by portraying information from a parallel network scan in 3D will help make
network traffic easier and faster to decipher.
Procedures:
If you decide to participate, your part will involve completing a paper-and-pencil survey
during a scheduled session. It is anticipated that completion of the survey will take about
90 minutes or at most 2 hours of your time. Your responses on the survey will remain
anonymous and kept under a code number rather than any personal identifier. Only group-
level results will be used for research purposes.
If you decide to be in this study, your part will involve one visit to the laboratory for
approximately one to two hours. In this visit you will be asked to first look at the result of a
2D parallel scanner. This information is generated through the Georgia Tech network and
will be from several leading 2D parallel network scanners. Then the volunteer participant,
you, will be asked to wear a pair of 3D shutter vision glasses and be seated in front of a 3D
monitor. Then a series of the same network traffic information previously generated will be
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displayed, but this time using the 3D parallel scanner. Then a research assistant will ask you
some questions about the differences between the two ways of portraying network traffic.
You will be asked to compare and contrast the generated images for clarity of information
and easiness of view. The total amount of time you will be in the laboratory is no more
than 2 hours. Remember, you may stop at any time.
Risks or Discomforts:
The study involves no more than minimal risk associated with wearing 3D shutter vision
glasses and watching a 3D monitor.
Benefits:
You are not likely to benefit in any way from joining this study. We hope that what we
learn will someday help network administrators to process network data more efficiently.
The speed up in information processing will help to initiate a protective response against
network threats.
Compensation to You:
There is no compensation for participation.
Confidentiality:
The following procedures will be followed to keep your personal information confidential
in this study: The data collected about you will be kept private to the extent allowed by
law. To protect your privacy, your records will be kept under a code number rather than
by name. Your records will be kept in locked files and only study staff will be allowed to
look at them. Your name and any other fact that might point to you will not appear when
results of this study are presented or published. Your privacy will be protected to the extent
allowed by law. To make sure that this research is being carried out in the proper way,
the Georgia Institute of Technology IRB may review study records. The Office of Human
Research Protections and/or the Food and Drug Administration may also look over study
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records during required reviews.
Costs to You:
There are no costs to you, other than your time, for being in this study.
In Case of Injury/Harm:
If you are injured as a result of being in this study, please contact the Principal Investigator,
Troy Nunnally at troy.nunally@gatech.edu. Neither the Principal Investigator nor Georgia
Institute of Technology has made provision for payment of costs associated with any injury
resulting from participation in this study.
Participant Rights:
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You do not have to be in this study if you don’t
want to be. You have the right to change your mind and leave the study at any time without
giving any reason and without penalty. Any new information that may make you change
your mind about being in this study will be given to you. You will be given a copy of this
consent form to keep. You do not waive any of your legal rights by signing this consent
form.
Questions about the Study:
If you have any questions about the study, you may contact
Troy Nunnally
troy.nunnally@gatech.edu
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact
Ms. Kelly Winn, Georgia Institute of Technology
Office of Research Compliance, at (404) 385-2175.
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If you sign below, it means that you have read (or have had read to you) the informa-








The computer monitor should show the desktop and scenarios should be closed.
Hi, User’s name. My name is Investigator’s Name, and I will be walking you through
this session today.
Before we begin, I would like to verify that you are 18+ years of age. Are you 18 or
above 18 years of age?
I have some information for you, and Im going to read it to make sure that I cover
everything. You probably already have a good idea of why we asked you here, but I will
briefly go over it again. Were asking people to try using a 3D network security tool that is
in development to determine whether it works as intended. In this visit, you will be asked
to compare and contrast generated images using 3D shutter glasses for clarity of informa-
tion and ease of viewing. These images will be visualizations from network traffic data
generated from network scanners. Then, a research assistant will ask you a few questions
about the differences between the two ways of portraying network traffic. The total amount
of time you will be in the laboratory will not exceed 2 hours. The session should range
between 60 min to 90 minutes.
The first thing I want to clarify is that we are testing the tool, not you. Do not worry
about making mistakes or incorrect answers. We want you to feel free to use the tool
naturally. Testing here today is one place where you dont have to worry about making
mistakes.
As you use the tool, Im going to ask you to think out loud as much as possible. In other
words, please talk out your thoughts and the actions you are taking to complete a task. This
will be a big help to us.
Please do not hold anything back or worry that youre going to hurt our feelings. We
want to hear your honest reactions so that we can improve this tool. If you have any
questions as we go along, please ask. I may not be able to answer them right away during
testing as we are interested in how people perform when they do not have guidance from
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someone. If you still have any questions when everything is completed, I will try to answer
them then. Please let me know if you need to take a break at any time. I will be here taking
notes and observing this session to help us understand the user experience and further
evaluate the tool. Additionally, the actions you perform and the time to complete each task
will be recorded.
Now that you have a basic understanding of our tests, do you have any questions?
Answer questions
Great, please read and fill out this consent form so that we can proceed with the testing
process. Please ask any questions that you may have about the consent form once you have
finished reading it.
Give them the consent form and a pen
Ok. Before we look at the tool, Id like you to take a quick survey to get an understanding
of your expertise level.
Give them the pre-survey
Here is your task: you are a security network analyst for a huge company and you are
asked to look at the network traffic and point out any peculiar activity and explain what is
going on as quickly as you can by looking at various visualization images.
In front of you is a desktop with the tool.
Optional script for 3D: In addition, there is a pair of 3D glasses. Please put on the
glasses and let me know if 3D properly works on the screen. If it works, please let me know.
Now, I will explain the components of the user interface and the visualization techniques
involved in the session so you completely understand the interface. I will also introduce
the various scenarios understand the concept of the visualization techniques they will inter-
face with during the experiment. The scenarios contain both malicious and non-malicious
network activity.
Explain the components and perform warm-up session.
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Once you press the start button, we would like you to do a narrative of what you think
looks peculiar on the network and explain everything you see. If you do not see anything
peculiar, then let us know that as well. While viewing the visualization, please answer the
questions on the provided on the post survey form. Once you have fully completed all the
questions, press the end button.
Repeat for all scenarios.
Do you have any questions for me, now that we are finished?
Thank them and escort them out.
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Recruitment: Email
From: troy.nunnally@gatech.edu Subject: Volunteers Wanted for a Research Study
Hello,
We are currently looking for volunteers for a Research Study that investigates network
scans/attacks using 3D shutter glasses and multi-touch systems. The purpose of the re-
search is to evaluate whether portraying information from network activity in three dimen-
sions (3D) or with multi-touch system will reduce human error and decrease task comple-
tion time. If you decide to participate, your visit to the laboratory will take 60 - 90 minutes
but no more than 2 hours of your time. The research study will be conducted on January
22- February, 2014 located in the Georgia Institute of Technologys Klaus Building, room
3361. In this visit, you will be asked to compare and contrast generated 2D images and
3D images using 3D shutter glasses for clarity of information and ease of view or navigate
within network application using a multi-touch system.
With your assistance, we hope to gain significant insights into understanding network
data more efficiently and initiate a proactive response against network security threats.
The study requires basic knowledge in computer networking.Subjects must be 18+ years
of age. If you are interested in participating, please sign up for an available time slot at
SignUp Genius or email Troy Nunnally at troy.nunnally@gatech.edu.
The PI for this project is Raheem Beyah. If you have any questions for the Principal






Survey given before the experimentation starts. This survey ensuresWe will assume that
most of the participants possess a rudimentary knowledge of network security. Thus, the
participants might not be familiar with the specific types of port scans or attacks. However,
they will possess adequate knowledge to provide insight about any peculiar activity and
describe the events.
Knowledge of Internetworking (check one level):
Novice Amateur Advanced Expert
Knowledge of Network Security (check one level):
Novice Amateur Advanced Expert
List Internetworking related classes taken, if any:
List any network attacks you may know, if any:
Survey
Survey given after each scenario
We will assume that most of the participants possess a rudimentary knowledge of net-
work security. Thus, the participants might not be familiar with the specific types of port
scans or attacks. However, they will possess adequate knowledge to provide insight about
any peculiar activity and describe the events.
Session 1 (2D vs 3D)
Session 1 Scenarios:
1. Please Identify the source IP and the source port. (timed)
2. Please identify the destination IP and the destination port or port range. (timed)
3. Does any port scan exist (Is any port scan being performed)? (timed?) If so, can you
describe the port scan in detail? (verbally explained)
4. How many attacks are present in the network data? (possibly timed)
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5. Rate the effectiveness of each visualization. 1-10 (10 being the best)
Session 2 (3D vs 3D stereoscopic)
Session 2 Scenarios:
1. Can you list the number of vulnerable nodes? (timed)
2. List the nodes that are most vulnerable. (timed)
3. On ”specific node” list the vulnerabilities. (timed)
4. List the safe nodes (timed)
5. Rate the effectiveness of the Stereoscopy. 1-10 (10 being the best)
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